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Ventures in the China Trade:  An Analysis
of China's Emerging Legal  Framework
for the Regulation  of Foreign Investment
William P.  Alford*
Daid  B irenbaum**
In this Article, Messrs.  Alford and  Birenbaum examine laws and regu-
lations  recentlypromulgated  by the People's  Republic of China  to govern the
conduct of  business and  investment in China. After establishing  the cultural,
historical,  bureaucratic  and  developmental  contexts within which the authors
believe these laws and  regulations  must be understood,  they comprehensively
examine and discuss the new legal  pronouncements.
The announcement, two years ago, of The Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Joint Ventures  Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment (Joint Venture Law)'  was greeted with much fanfare in the West.
* Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C.  Adjunct Profes-
sor,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center.  Member  District  of Columbia  and  United  States
Supreme Court Bars.  B.A.,  1970,  Amherst College; LL.B.  1972,  University of Cambridge;  M.A.-
Chinese Studies,  1974, Yale University; M.A.-History,  1975,  Yale University; J.D.,  1977, Harvard
Law School.
** Partner,  Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver  & Kampelman,  Washington,  D.C.  Member  Con-
necticut  and District of Columbia  Bars;  B.A.,  1959,  Brown University;  J.D.,  1962,  Harvard Law
School.
1 Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo  Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (The Law of the People's
Republic  of China on Joint  Ventures  Using  Chinese  and Foreign  Investment), adopted at the
Second  Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and formally issued andVentures in the China Trade
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To  old  China  traders,  would-be  China lawyers  and  expectant  China
businesspersons,  this pathfinding  legislation  promised  new  and  even
exotic  opportunities  to do  business in the world's  most populous  na-
tion.2  To date, however, the promise remains largely unfulfilled.  As of
this writing, few foreign investors have been able to avail themselves of
the invitation to do business in China (PRC).
Fortunately for all concerned, the romantic view of this new open-
ing to China has been replaced by a more  realistic assessment of the
burdens as well as the benefits to be gained through engaging China in
commercial  entente. 3  This is,  therefore,  a  good  time  to  analyze  the
problems  and possibilities presented by China's conditional  receptive-
ness to foreign  investment.
At the outset, we would like to make plain our bias as to method-
ology.  In our view, one cannot meaningfully  undertake  to study con-
temporary  Chinese  legal  developments  by simply dissecting  statutory
language, such as the Joint Venture Law,  as if it stood  alone, isolated
from the rich  context  of Chinese  thought and  experience.4  We  will,
therefore,  examine  the cultural,  historical,  bureaucratic,  developmen-
tal, and statutory  contexts  of the Joint Venture  Law as a prelude  to
analyzing its limitations and suggesting steps a potential foreign inves-
tor should take in structuring his approach toward the Chinese.  For, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, the Joint Venture Law and related Chinese
laws  governing  foreign investment  must be  construed  as one would a
constitution:  their significance is "to be gathered not simply by taking
the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth."5
THE CULTURAL  CONTEXT
The first and most basic aspect to be considered in evaluating the
made effective on July 8,  1979  [hereinafter cited as Joint Venture Law].  The Chinese text may be
found in  Remin  Ribao  (People's  Daily), July  9,  1979, at  1.  A translation  by  Xinhua, the New
China News Agency, may be found at  18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS  1163,  1163-65 (1979).  Editor's
Note:  The Pinyin system for romanizing Chinese names and titles will be used throughout this
article, except where that would create confusion  due to customary usage.
2  China Trade with PRC Could Trple, Council President  Says [1979]  237  INT'L TRADE  RE-
PORTER'S  U.S.  EXPORT  WEEKLY  (BNA)  at  A-5;  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  BUREAU  OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,  GIST:  US-PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  (1979);  Surrey  &
Soble, Chinese Removing Joint Venture Investment Barriers,  Legal Times of Washington,  Oct. 22,
1979,  at  19; U.S.-China Trade Seen Soaring, J. COM.,  Jan. 22, 1980, at  10.
3  Birenbaum & Afford, China's  Law on Joint Ventures  - The First Year in Review, NAT'L L.
3., July  21,  1980,  at 26.
4  Birenbaum, Doing Business With  China, Wall  St. J.,  Aug. 31,  1979, at 6, col. 3.
5  Gompers v. U.S.,  233  U.S.  604,  610 (1914).Northwestern  Journal  of
International  Law  & Business  3:56(1981)
Joint Venture Law is the attitude of the Chinese toward law itself.  One
of the clearest continuities between classical and Communist China is a
common disdain for law as a means of regulating society.  An ancient
Chinese fable has it that law was the creation of barbarian peoples liv-
ing  beyond  the  reach of China and  its  civilized  culture.7  For them,
behavior could be governed only by means of rigid external guidelines.
This  is not to say  that ancient China did not  develop  a system of law
worthy of comparison  with that of classical  Greece  or other societies.
Indeed, it has been argued, on the basis of documentary evidence, that
such  a  system  may have  existed  as  early  as  the reign  of the Western
Zhou  (1122-700  B.C.).8  Chinese  archaeologists  have, in the past dec-
ade, found bamboo slips containing portions of cases that can be traced
back to the 3rd century B.C.9  Nonetheless, the perception of law as an
alien and dubious instrument was widely held throughout Chinese his-
tory.'
0
Confucianism  did much  to  reinforce,  if not  actually  create,  this
general  perception  of law.'"  The words of Confucius  stress  that in a
properly ordered society the emperor and the people  adhere to mutu-
ally  reinforcing  standards  of  behavior  appropriate  to  their  roles.' 2
Thus, the emperor leads by force of example and moral suasion, rather
than power  and punishment.  The people  follow, not out of fear but
because, through education and self-cultivation, they have internalized
the  i,  which  are the norms  of social intercourse  appropriate  to their
particular  stations  in  life.'3  Laws,  being  fixed  and  external,  should
have  little  place  in a  well-governed  society.' 4  Nor can  law possibly
serve as a substitute for fi, for if all that interdicts improper behavior is
a  set  of written  rules,  Confucian  doctrine  holds  that  unworthy  but
crafty persons will be certain to find a way around them.  As Confucius
6  V. Li,  LAW  WITHOUT  LAWYERS  (1978).
7  This tale is from  the SHU  JING  (THE  BOOK OF  DOCUMENTS),  one of the five  fundamental
works of Chinese culture, dating from the 2nd Century B.C., known as the five Classics.  See The
Book ofDocuments, 22 BULLETIN  OF THE  MUSEUM  OF FAR EASTERN  ANTIQUITIES  84 (B.  Karl-
gren trans.  1950).
8  H.  CREEL, THE ORIGINS  OF STATECRAFT  IN  CHINA,  VOLUME  ONE:  THE WESTERN  CHOU
161-195  (1970).  Indeed, it has even been suggested that elements of a legal system existed as early
as  the Shang dynasty (1766-1122  B.C.).  See K. C.  CHANG,  SHANG  CIVILIZATION 201-205  (1981).
9  THE T'ANG  CODE:  VOLUME  I:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7 (W. Johnson trans.  1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Johnson].
10  See  LI, note 6 supra; Schwartz,  On Attitudes Toward Law in China,  reprinted  in J. COHEN,
THE CRIMINAL  PROCESS  IN  THE  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA,  1949-1963:  AN INTRODUCTION
62-70 (1968)  [hereinafter  cited as Cohen].
11  Id
12  THE ANALECTS  OF CONFUCIUS  (2 vols.)  (A. Waley trans.  1958).
13  Id,  Book IL
14  IdVentures in the China Trade
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himself said:  "[G]overn  the people by regulations, keep order among
them by chastisements,  and they will flee  from you and  lose all self-
respect.  Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual
[fi] and they will keep their self-respect  and come to you of their own
accord."" i
The dangers the Confucians saw of relying upon law as a primary
tool of governance were borne out with the rise in the 3rd century B.C.
of the state  of Qin, a  semi-barbaric  people  residing just beyond  the
Yellow River basin, the core of classical Chinese civilization.  The Qin
relied heavily upon the  "rule of law,"  not to protect the rights of the
individual, but rather to regiment a strict, martial society. 16  All per-
sons, save  for the  Qin emperor  were regulated  by  imperial decree.17
Although  the Qin succeeded  where others had  failed in bringing  the
warring states of the Yellow River region together into a single unified
empire  (hence, the name  China),  their hegemony  was  short-lived-a
fact that the Confucians have been quick to ascribe in large measure to
reliance on law to regulate behavior.18
Not long after the demise of the Qin, the views espoused by Con-
fucius and his followers became state orthodoxy.  Ensconsed under the
patronage  of the  Emperor  Han  Wudi  (who  reigned  from  140  to  87
B.C.), this new dogma held grip over the people for a remarkably  long
period.19  In effect, the new orthodoxy became a cloak of legitimacy to
be worn by all who aspired seriously  to govern  China throughout the
imperial period until the final collapse of Imperial China in  1911.20
With the assumption of responsibility for governance,  Confucian
oriented  scholar-officials  from  the  Han  dynasty  (206  B.C.-A.D. 220)
onward had little choice but to deal with law.2'  The Han commenced
the preparation  of a comprehensive  legal  code,22 known  as the  Zhi-
uzhang lu, that served as a basis for the Sui (A.D.  581-617)  and T'ang
15 Id.  Book II at 3.
16  To the extent that the Qin had a coherent ideology, it was best expounded by  Han Fei-tzu
(280?-233  B.C.).  See THE  COMPLETE  WORKS  OF HAN  FEI-Tzu (2 vols.) (W. K. Liao trans.  1939
and  1959).  For a thorough account of the Qin, see D. BODDE, CHINA'S  FIRST UNIFIER:  A STUDY
OF  THE CH'IN DYNASTY  As  SEEN IN THE LIFE  OF LI  Ssu 280?-208 B.C. (1938).
17  See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  LAW IN IMPERIAL  CHINA 23-29  (1967); F. MOTE,  INTELLEC-
TuAL FOUNDATIONS  OF CHINA  111-128  (1971).
18  SsU-MA  CH'IEN:  GRAND  HISTORIAN  OF  CHINA  33  (B. Watson trans.  1958).
19  CH'U T'UNG-Tsu  (Qu TONGZU),  LAW  AND  SOCIETY  IN  TRADITIONAL CHINA,  280-289  and
passim (1961)  [hereinafter cited as Qu].
20 Id.  See also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 62-65.
21  A.  HULSEWE,  REMNANTS  OF HAN  LAW, 4-94 (1954).
22 Id.Northwestern  Journal  of
International  Law  & Business  3:56(1981)
(A.D.  618-907)  codes.  These codes in turn proved to be models, in both
format  and  content,  for subsequent  Chinese codes  through  the Qing
dynasty  (A.D.  1644-1911),  as  well  as  for  Japanese,  Korean  and
Vietnamese codes.
2 3
But as Qu Tongzu and others have shown, in turning to law, and
in  ultimately  developing  a  sophisticated  legal  system,  Confucian
scholar-officials of the Han and later dynasties did not merely see their
function  as that of applying  abstract,  objective  rules.24  Rather, they
"confucianized"  the law, molding it to reflect and reinforce Confucian
norms."  As the famed early Qing scholar Gu Yenwu (A.D.  1613-1682)
wrote:
[W]hen  our predecessors  initiated  legislation, they could not thoroughly
study the facts and circumstances  and prepare in advance for future revi-
sion.  Their successors  followed what was already  a corrupt practice, and
were restricted by the established statutes which they could not change, or
had to make by-laws, to amend them.  Thereupon the more numerous the
laws,  the more they  were abused.  All  the affairs  of the  empire  became
more  vexatious.  The result  was that the laws were not understood  and
not enforced.26
This result was to be avoided by substituting precept for prescription,
while retaining the formal structure of law without which it would not
be possible to govern  effectively.
The  disdain  of ancient  Confucian  ideologues  for  law,  notwith-
standing their adroit use of it, has been matched by that of their latter-
day Communist counterparts.27  To be sure, building upon the laws de-
veloped in the Zhiangxi  Soviet and later in the Shenxi-Gansu-Ningxia
and Shaanxi-Chahar-Hobei  border regions, the Communists  strove in
the early  years  of the PRC to  use law  as an aid in consolidating  the
revolution and achieving  its goals.28  Indeed, in their first four years in
power, China's  Communist  rulers promulgated  major new laws  con-
cerning subjects  ranging from marriage to the ownership  of industrial
enterprises to political offenses.29  But, ultimately, Communist mistrust
of the Nationalist-trained  legal professionals  and populist impatience
with "experts,"  generally coalesced with and reinforced traditional Chi-
23  Having published his translation of the General Principles section of the Tang Code, Wal-
lace Johnson is presently translating  the remainder of the Code.  Johnson, supra note 9.
24 See  BODDE  & MoRus, supra note  17,  at 27-29.
25  [d
26  Gu Yenwu,  quoted in  S.  Y.  TENG  &  J. FAIRBANK,  CHINA'S  RESPONSE  TO  THE  WEST  9
(1954).
27  See LI, supra note  6, at  1-21.
28  Lubman, Form and  Function in the Chinese Criminal Process, 69  COLUM.  L. REv.  535, 536-
540  (1969).
29  See Cohen, supra note 10.Ventures in the China Trade
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nese attitudes.30  Consequently, within the PRC, law was largely deem-
phasized  as  an  effective  instrument  for  accomplishing  social  change
until the late  1970's.31
THE HISTORICAL  CONTEXT
China's experience with the West over the past two centuries rein-
forced  ancient  Chinese  antipathy  toward  foreigners  and  heightened
Chinese suspicions about the role of law.  From their first contact with
the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century until the Opium War (1839-
1842), China's rulers sought to cordon off and control commercial and
other interaction with the West.32  Foreign merchants were restricted to
a temporary presence-without  spouses and for no more than the four
to five month trading season-in small compounds located on an island
in the metropolis of Canton, itself a corner of China remote from the
capital.  All  trade  had  to  be  carried  on  through  a  small  circle  of
merchants, known collectively as the "Hoppo.''33  To the constant frus-
tration of state chartered trading companies-such  as the British East
India Company-and their national governments,  direct dealings with
the Chinese government,  as well as with Chinese producers and con-
sumers, were barred.34
The pact settling the Opium War intensified  Chinese hostility toL
ward  Western  institutions.  Under pressure  from  aggressive  English
traders, the British prevailed upon the Chinese to grant a series of con-
cessions,  including year-round  access  to five major coastal ports,  the
authority to contact Chinese  officials directly, the extension of British
law to Her Majesty's  subjects in  China, and  all other privileges  that
might  in the future be granted  to any other foreign power.35  During
30 See  Li,  supra note 6,  at 22-32.
31  Since 1978, the Chinese have turned increasingly to law as a means through which to stabi-
lize and organize society.  During this period the Chinese have issued numerous laws and regula-
tions,  -including  the  PRC's  first  substantive  criminal  code,  a  code  of criminal  procedure,  an
environmental  law, regulations regarding  lawyers, regulations regarding  foreign offices in China
and, as will be discussed, various laws and regulations regarding joint ventures and related com-
mercial activities.  See text accompanying notes 118-343 infra; Lubman, New Developments in Law
in the People'r  Republic of China, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.  122 (1980);  Alford, Law and Chinese
Foreign  Trade, 28 PROBLEMS  OF COMMUNISM  81  (1979).
32  Wills, Ch'ing Relations  i7th the Dutch, 1662-1690,  in THE CHINESE  WORLD ORDER 225 (J.
Fairbank ed.  1968); J.  Fairbank, The Earl  Treay System in the Chinese World Order, in id.  at
257.
33  Edwards, The Old  Canton System of  Foreign  Trade, in LAW AND  POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOR-
EIGN TRADE  360 (V.  Li ed.  1977).
34 Id.
35  The Treaty of Nanking is found in L. HERTSLET,  VI HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL TREATInES
221-225  (1908).  See H. MoRSE,  I INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 298-341
(1910).Northwestern  Journal  of
International  Law  & Business  3:56(1981)
the remainder of the 19th century, Great Britain, as well as the United
States, France, Germany, Japan and Russia, not to mention more than
a dozen lesser nations,3 6 continued to expand this list of territorial and
jurisdictional concessions. 3 7  By  1900, the once proud Middle Kingdom
had been carved  up into a number  of smaller  spheres dominated  by
Western and Japanese  "barbarians." 3 8  These foreign powers were not
above using law and, particularly, their concept of extraterritorial legal
privilege,  to promote  their  various  diplomatic,  financial,  commercial
and religious objectives.
On  the diplomatic  front,  the  foreign  powers  insisted  that China
abandon  her  traditional  practice  of  conducting  foreign  relations
through the "tribute system,"  under which all other states  owed fealty
to China.39  Instead, the Chinese were forced to deal with these powers
according to "modern" legal principles. 4 °  Yet, at the same time, Great
Britain, Germany  and others invoked international  law to justify  the
seizure of suzerainty  over Chinese territory and the imposition of their
own laws upon  China.4  Financially,  China found  herself having  to
surrender control over her most vital source  of revenue-the  Imperial
Customs4 2- and to make numerous other concessions to satisfy a vari-
ety of obligations to Western governments, including payment of heavy
reparations.43  Commercially,  Western  merchants  in  Shanghai  and
other treaty  ports competed  energetically  with their Chinese  counter-
parts.n"  In  that  effort,  they  were  advantaged  not  only  by  mbre  ad-
vanced  business  techniques,  but  by  military  power  in  the  form  of
Western forces on Chinese soil, and legal privileges such as virtual im-
36  The  extraterritorial  privileges  exacted  by  those  nations are described  in W.  FISHEL,  THE
END  OF  EXTRATERRITORIALITY  IN CHINA  1-50  (1952).  Many  of the treaties  embodying  these
relations are reproduced  in TREATIES  BETWEEN  THE  EMPIRE OF  CHINA AND  FOREIGN  POWERS
(W. Meyers  ed.  1877).
37  FISHEL, supra note 36,  at  1-50.
38  Id.
39  Under this system, China was the center of civilization,  to which all other states, at least
nominally, paid tribute.
40  j.  FAIRBANK,  TRADE  AND  DIPLOMACY  ON  THE  CHINA  COAST:  THE  OPENING  OF  THE
TREATY  PORTS  1842-1854  96-98 (1964).
41  1.  Hsu, CHINA'S  ENTRANCE  INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS:  THE DIPLOMATIC  PHASE  1858-
1880 (1960);  Hsin,  "flat  Does  Bourgeois International Law Explain About the Question of  Interven-
tion?, in  Kuo-CHi  WEN-TI YEN-CHIU  (1960), quoted in  J.  COHEN  &  H.  CHIU,  PEOPLE'S  CHINA
AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  A  DOCUMENTARY  STUDY  139-172  (1974).
42  J.  SPENCE,  To CHANGE  CHINA:  WESTERN  ADVISORS  IN  CHINA  1620-1960  93-128  (1969).
43  M.  YOUNG,  THE RHETORIC  OF EMPIRE:  AMERICAN  CHINA  1895-1901  172-218  (1968).
44 CHI  SHU-FEN,  JINGJI  GINLUEXIA  ZHI  ZHUNGGUO  (ECONOMIC  AGGRESSION  IN  CHINA)
(1925)  recounts numerous specific instances of foreign economic activity in  China aided by extra-
territoriality.Ventures in the China Trade
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munity from suit under Chinese law.a"  At the same time, foreign mis-
sionaries held out to potential Chinese converts not only the promise of
divine salvation but also of valuable, if worldly, exemptions from Chi-
nese law.46
Not surprisingly, the Chinese came to resent bitterly this Western
presence.4 7  Although the Chinese attempted on occasion to use inter-
national  law to fend  off excessive  incursions into  their sovereignty,48
they came generally to regard the West's laws as little more than weap-
ons used by the powerful to advance their interests.  As the noted Chi-
nese diplomat Tsui Kuo-ying said in 1891:  "[llnternational  law is just
like Chinese statutory law-reasonable but unreliable.  If there is right
without might, the right will not prevail."49
Nor did these sentiments  diminish,  even after the Qing  was top-
pled in  1911  and a Chinese  republic established.  In the words  of a
handbill  circulated  by  a group  of Cantonese  student  activists  in the
1920's:
[A]  cursory  glance  at the  treaties which bind  China today  will  readily
show how unequal they are .... These unequal treaties ...  [have] for
a long time  relegated  China to  a position  worse than  an  enslaved col-
ony  ....  Thus  it has  been possible  to permit  even a common  foreign
policeman to exercise the power of killing and wounding Chinese citizens
on their home soil.50
The antipathy toward the West-and particularly toward its com-
mercial and legal presence and practices--expressed  by these Canton-
ese  students  was  echoed  by  the  leaders  of  China's  Communist
Revolution.  Mao Zedong, himself, wrote in  1939:
[T]he  imperialist powers  have  forced China  to  sign numerous  unequal
treaties  by which they  have  acquired  the right  to  station land  and sea
forces  and exercise  consular jurisdiction,  and  they have  carved  up the
whole  country  into  imperialist  spheres  of influence  ....  [They]  have
gained control of all the important trading ports in China by these une-
qual treaties and have marked off areas in many of these ports as conces-
sions under their direct administration.  They have also gained control of
45 Id  See S.  COCHRAN,  BIG BUSINESS  IN  CHINA:  SINO-FOREIGN  RIVALRY  IN  THE  CIGA-
RETrE  INDUSTRY  1890-1930  (1979);  A.  FEUERWERKER,  CHINA'S  EARLY  INDUSTRIALIZATION
(1958).
46  .Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN  CHINA  461-463 (1970).  See P. COHEN,  CHINA  AND  CHRIS-
TIANrrYpazi7m  (1963).
47 Id  See  CHI, supra note 44.
48  In  1864, for example, the Tsungli Yamen (the equivalent of Qing China's foreign ministry)
under  the  leadership of Prince Kung  used  Henry  Wheaton's  treatise  ELEMENTS  OF  INTERNA-
TIONAL  LAW  to persuade  the Prussians to relinquish  a Danish ship they had seized in Chinese
waters.  See  Hsu, supra note 41,  at 132-145; TENG  & FAIRBANK,  supra note 26, at 96-98.
49 COHEN & CHIu,  supra note 41,  at  10.
50  33 CHINA  WEEKLY  REV.  182-183  (Aug. 8,  1925).Northwestern  Journal  of
International  Law  & Business  3:56(1981)
China's  customs, foreign trade and communications.. 
Within three years  after the creation of the PRC, all commercial
enterprises owned by United States citizens and other foreigners  were
nationalized.52  Nearly  all Westerners  fled or were imprisoned. 3  At
the same time, a new foreign elite began to emerge,  composed of Rus-
sian advisers who gained a status akin to that which Western merchants
once enjoyed. 4  Not until the final, abrupt withdrawal of the Russians
by 1960  was China at last free of a privileged class of foreigners.5
THE  BUREAUCRATIC  CONTEXT
If the  Chinese  did not invent bureaucracy,  they were  among  its
earliest and most enthusiastic practitioners. 6  Notwithstanding the ef-
forts of Chairman Mao and others to keep the bureaucracy in line, its
influence over the translation of policy into practice remains decisive to
this day.57  Indeed, the most difficult task facing joint ventures may be
to mesh what  is meant  to be  an autonomous  corporate  entity with  a
state-controlled  economy governed by bureaucrats.
Imperial bureaucrats tended to govern with an eye toward promot-
ing Confucian values, which placed heavy emphasis upon the mainte-
nance  of harmony  and  the  preservation  of order  and  rank. 8  The
present Chinese bureaucracy  applies what might best be characterized
as a mixture of socialist principles and bureaucratic conservatism.5 9  In
so  doing,  the PRC's mammoth  bureaucracy  is functioning  in  almost
contradictory  fashion,  promoting  socialist  change  in  theory  while
retarding it in practice through bureaucratic inertia and rigidity.60
Although the state, party and military bureaucracies  all play roles
in the formation and administration of the economic plans that guide
China today, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that few peo-
ple  outside,  or indeed, inside  China  really know  how  the  plans are
51  MAO TsE-TUNG,  1 SELECTED  WORKS  OF  MAO  TSE-TUNG  311  (1965).
52  T. Thompson,  China's Nationalization  of Foreign Firms:  The Politics of Hostage  Capital-
ism:  1949-57  (Occasional  Papers/Reprints  Series in Contemporary  Asian Studies No. 6,  1979).
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made and operate.  Prominent  Western analysts of China's economy6 1
suggest that data on basic economic needs and capabilities  filters up-
ward  from  individual  enterprises  through  state,  party, and  military
committees, which tend to have overlapping membership, especially at
the higher levels. 2  Sectional plans  are then prepared  by a relatively
high level  state  elite,  particularly in the  State Planning Commission,
State Economic Commission, State Agricultural Commission and State
Capital Construction Commission.63  Once the plans have been formu-
lated, directives based upon them are developed.64  As these directives
are considered  within the bureaucracy,  they become  increasingly  de-
tailed, fixed and inflexible.
Not surprisingly, performance on both the macro and micro levels
has fallen short of the planned mark.65  Witness the shortages and dis-
tribution  problems  China  has  experienced  during the  past  three  de-
cades.66  Witness also the seeming heresy of the need for professional
middlemen (caigouyuan)  whose unofficial but indispensable function is
to enable the economy to work by procuring needed supplies not allot-
ted by the state plan and disposing of production in excess of the state
plan  .6   As such, these traders, or "fixers,"  supply a market  correction
force  for the system.68  Nonetheless,  available evidence  indicates that
during the past twenty years  state plans  have determined  the general
manner and scope of operation of the vast majority of China's indus-
trial enterprises.69  Vital decisions  that have been made routinely pur-
suant  to  the  state  plans  or  related  directives  include  access  to
61  Id.;  C.  HOWE,  CHINA'S  ECONOMY:  A  BASIC  GUIDE  30-65  (1978);  A.  DONNITHORNE,
CHINA'S ECONOMIC  SYSTEM  457-511  (1967); N. LARDY,  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  AND  DISTRIBUTION
IN CHINA  137-172  (1978).
62  J. WANG,  CONTEMPORARY  CHINESE POLITICS 92-126  (1980).
63  China's State Economic Commission (SEC),  CHINA Bus.  REv., July-Aug.  1979, at 16-17; The
Role and Functions of  China's  Commissions,  CHINA  Bus.  REV.,  Mar.-Apr. 1979,  at  14.
64  Often the plans are not made public until well after their effective date.  ECKSTEIN, supra
note 60, at  111-112.
65  Chen, Economic  Modernization in Post-Mao  China"  Policies, Problems and Prospects,  in
CHINESE  ECONOMY  POST  MAO:  A  COMPENDIUM  OF PAPERS  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  JOINT  ECO-
NOMIC  COMMITTEE OF THE CONGRESS  OF THE UNITED  STATES  165 (J. Hardt ed. 1978)  [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hardt].
66  Dernberger & Fasenfart, China's Post-Mao Economic Future, in Hardt, supra note 65, at 8-
16; Qian Junrai, Readjusting  and Restructuring the Chinese Economy  (unpublished paper avail-
able through the co-authors).
67  DONNITHORNE, supra note 61, at 290-291;  Butler, China's Host of  BuyingAgents Patch Up
Oversight of Planning, Asian Wall  St.  J., July  25,  1978,  at 8; Butterfield,  China  Gingerly  Gives
Private Business a Try, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981,  § E, at 3.
68  Butterfield, supra  note 67, at 3.
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"investment capital,"7  specific sources of supply for needed raw mater-
ials and utilities, availability of labor (or, more typically, the number of
workers a plant would be required to take on),7' product mix, projected
output, pricing,  profitability  and  assigned  "customers."72  Individual
industrial entities, in effect, have been left with little operational discre-
tion. 73
In recent  years,  however, China  began  gradually  to decentralize
decision making in the economic sphere.7 4  Local  governments,  plants
and other enterprises were  given broader power and concomitant  re-
sponsibility for its exercise.75  For example, in the large and important
province of Sichuan, Deng  Xiaoping's birthplace, which Zhao Ziyang
headed and used as an economic laboratory prior to assuming the pre-
miership in September of 1980, many enterprises  have been "free"  to
earn  a profit, raise their own investment capital, select product lines in
addition to those required by the state plan, market over-the-quota pro-
duction, and utilize excess earnings for worker incentives, better worker
benefits,  advertising,  reinvestment, or the direct acquisition abroad  of
needed foreign equipment.76  Astute Western observers saw Zhao's ele-
vation as evidence that the Sichuan experience might become the fore-
runner  of  a  nation-wide  experimentation  with  market  oriented
mechanisms.77  As of this writing,  the accuracy  of that prediction and
the likelihood that China's movement toward decentralization will sur-
vive remain very much in doubt, as the PRC continues to veer between
its mercantilist  and Maoist pasts.78
THE  DEVELOPMENTAL  CONTEXT
In January of 1975,  Premier  Zhou  Enlai called  upon the  Fourth
National People's Congress to embark upon a comprehensive  develop-
mental program that by the year 2000 would upgrade  Chinese agricul-
70 Id
71  EcKSTEIN, supra note  60, at  101-104.
72  Id  at  100-101.
73  Id  at  86-158.
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St. J.,  Aug. 29,  1980,  at  17.
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ture, industry, national defense  and  science to a level  comparable to
that of the world's great powers.79  As a first step toward realizing this
program, known as the Four Modernizations,  the Chinese launched in
1976  a  ten-year  plan  for  development  of the  national  economy. 0
Down-playing  the  emphasis  upon  self-reliant  socialist  development
that had characterized  previous five- and ten-year plans," 1  the 1976-85
version set as China's goals for the decade the construction of one hun-
dred  and  twenty major  new  infrastructure  projects,  including  thirty
electric power generating stations, ten steel complexes, eight coal fields,
six trunk railways,  five harbors,  and an  assortment of other projects,
including fertilizer plants, communications  satellites  and color televi-
sion, integrated circuitry  and truck factories.82
When finally made public in 1978,  China's  1976-85 ten-year plan
received enthusiastic  reviews  abroad and at home. 8 3  Foreign govern-
ments and companies, recognizing that tremendous infusions of foreign
cipital, heavy equipment and technology would be necessary to accom-
plish China's developmental goals, and facing sluggish demand for the
most part in their home markets,  they vied for access  to the Chinese
market. 4  On the financial side, in the year following Chairman Hua's
initial  exposition  of the  plan, government  developmental  banks  and
private institutions in Europe and Japan  seeking to take  advantage of
China's  reputation for  credit-worthiness,  offered  to make  more  than
$26 billion of generally low-interest, long-term financing85 available to
the PRC, which had  previously  eschewed  the  assumption  of foreign
debt. 6  During that same period, the governments of Japan and France
concluded  agreements  with  the  PRC  calling  for  billions  of dollars
worth of trade.87  For the most part, these agreements provided for the
exchange of oil, coal and other raw or semi-finished materials  for ad-
79  Zhou  Enlai, Report on the  Work ofthe Government (delivered  at the First  Session of the
Fourth National People's Congress), reprinted  in BEuJING  REV.,  Jan. 24,  1975, at 21-25.
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Fifth National People's Congress), reprinted  in BEuINO  REv.,  Mar.  10,  1978, at 7-40.
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vanced  industrial  equipment  and  data." 8  Countless  private  compa-
nies--offering  everything  from  oil  drilling  equipment  to  disco
records-also sought to sell their wares in China.89
The impact of Chairman  Hua's invitation to foreign business to-
gether with the opening of direct access to Chinese producers  and con-
sumers took the Chinese leadership by surprise.9"  Finding  themselves
with far greater  access to the West than had previously been the case,
ministries, provincial  and local governmental authorities  and even in-
dividual factories  competed  for sorely needed foreign technology  and
supplies.9'  It soon became apparent  to the leadership  that China was
unable to evaluate,  allocate and absorb  the full scope of what she was
being offered.92  Moreover, China's limited foreign exchange holdings,
estimated variously at $2 to $7 billion, were clearly inadequate to cover
all the imports. 93
Rather than incurring heavy foreign debt to make up the shortfall,
the leadership decided in early 1979 to postpone implementation  of the
ten-year plan in order to enter into a period, intended originally to last
through 1981, but now likely to extend at least until 1983, during which
China's  goals  could  be  reassessed  and  her  priorities  clearly  estab-
lished.94  The first and most dramatic result of this period of "readjust-
ment,"  as  the  Chinese  have  characterized  it,  was  the  suspension,
announced in February of 1979, of preliminary arrangements with Jap-
anese companies for steel mills, coal mine development  and major un-
dertakings in heavy industry.95  These projects had called for aggregate
expenditures of more than $2 billion.96  Over the course of the next four
months, British, French, German, United States  and additional Japa-
nese companies were informed of delays in the construction of nuclear
power plants, iron ore processing facilities  and international  class ho-
88  Id.
89  Chen, Spotlight on U.S.-P.A  C. Trade.- Review of 1978 Transactions  and Prospectsfor Ex-
pansion, Bus. AM.,  Sept. 24,  1979,  at 8-10.
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tels.9 7  These decisions  effectively  ended the honeymoon phase  of the
opening to the West, as the Chinese came to appreciate the hard trade-
offs  that had to be  made in rationing one of their most precious  and
limited  resources:  foreign  exchange.  With  that,  Western  exporters
were forced to recognize that China could hardly hope to buy all they
had to sell.98
The reappraisal  of priorities has produced  a significant  change in
direction.  In place of the major capital construction projects previously
planned,  attention has  been focused  increasingly  on "light industry,"
Chinese-style,  a  classification  that  encompasses  many  projects  that
would  be considered  "heavy"  if undertaken in the West.99  With  the
exception of such vital fields as agriculture, energy, and transportation,
emphasis is now being placed on projects with the potential to generate
foreign exchange rapidly."°
This policy  is intended  to produce  political  as well as economic
payoffs.  The shift toward  light industry means more  "plums" to dis-
tribute throughout the country in the form  of projects  capable of ab-
sorbing  large  numbers  of  China's  growing  unemployed  and
underemployed,  and of producing  those consumer  goods that  China's
workers lately have been encouraged to expect.' 0'  Thus, Deng and his
colleagues hope to begin to deliver on their promise to provide a better
material life; a promise which Deng, although not a charismatic leader
in the manner of Mao, is under considerable pressure to fulfill.02
China's determination to limit spending on imports to foreign ex-
change earned through exports and to concentrate foreign investment
in light industry was repeatedly underscored throughout the Third Ses-
sion of the Fifth National People's Congress, held in September of 1980
in Beijing.'03  Delivering the "Report on Financial Work,"  the Minister
of Finance, Wang  Bingqian, criticized  the fact that China's projected
deficit  for  1980  would  surpass  $4  billion,  notwithstanding  proposed
97  How Companies Can Respond to China's Slowdown,  CHINA  Bus.  REV.,  May-June  1979,  at
37-40.
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belt-tightening  measures' 0 4  that would promote greater accountability
in borrowing and thus  reduce China's debt.'0 5  The foreign exchange
saved  would  become  available  for  development  of light  industry.
0 6
Wang's message was reinforced in key addresses by outgoing Premier
Hua Guofeng1°7  and by the new Chairman of the State Planning Com-
mission, Vice Premier Yao Ilin.'08
Developments  since the  September  1980  session of the  Congress
have  made  it  clear  that the  Chinese  leadership  meant what  it  said.
Hundreds of millions of dollars of orders have been cancelled  or post-
poned.1 09  The most celebrated of the project cutbacks  is the Baoshan
steel complex." 0  Launched  in  1978  with great  fanfare,  the  Baoshan
project was planned to include a cold rolling steel mill, a hot strip steel
mill, an iron ore sintering plant, a continuous tubing mill and a chemi-
cal plant, as well  as new port and rail facilities to connect  Baoshan to
nearby Shanghai and other key ports."'  The project, with much of its
equipment  and technology to  come from Japanese,  German and, to a
lesser extent, U.S.  firms, had an initial projected cost of more than $5
billion." 2  But, as has happened with a number of other major capital
projects,  the estimates proved  low;  projected  needs  for the complex's
output appeared too high, and unexpected  difficulties-particularly re-
lated to infrastructure-were  all too abundant.' 13  The result  was that
Baoshan was both a severe problem in itself and an embarrassing sym-
bol of the shortcomings in the developmental  course  embarked  upon
only two  years  earlier.  In late  November  of  1980,  the  Chinese  in-
formed Nippon  Steel and other key suppliers that phase II of the pro-
ject, which  had been  intended  to double  the complex's  capacity to 6
million tons per year, had been postponed indefinitely." 4  In January
of 1981,  much of the rest of the Baoshan endeavor was halted, prompt-
104  Wang Bingqian, Report on the Final  State Accountsfor 1979,  the Draft  State Budgetfor 1980
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ing the Japanese government, under pressure from Japanese  firms, to
demand that China,  at a minimum,  compensate Japanese  companies
for their "out of pocket"  losses." 5  Notwithstanding the expressed  in-
tent of the Chinese leadership to make just recompense in accord with
conventional  international  practice, negotiators  have yet to work out
formulae for such payments."
6
Nor has  Baoshan  been the  only major project  subject to  recent
reassessment.  Agreements  for the  construction  of chemical, fertilizer
and petrochemical  plants  have reportedly been deferred  or cancelled,
as have contracts for many smaller purchases."
17
THE STATUTORY  CONTEXT
The Joint Venture Law
The  focal  point  of any discussion  of the  statutory  context  sur-
rounding joint ventures  in the PRC,  of course, is The  Law  on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese  and Foreign Investment.
China's  Joint Venture  Law was many months  in the making.""
Aided by foreign consultants, Chinese officials examined the joint ven-
ture codes  of Romania,  Yugoslavia, Japan  and  Singapore;  analyzed
what  was  necessary  to  attract  foreign  investment;  and  most  impor-
tantly,  considered  what would best  serve  China's  objectives. 119  The
product, effective immediately upon its promulgation  on July 8, 1979,
was a three page document containing a mere fifteen broadly-worded
articles.12 0  Very much in keeping  with the PRC's practice  of general
and aspirational  legislation,' 21 the Joint Venture  Law is  best under-
stood as  an enabling  act,  leaving specific  details  and programs  to be
115  Mitsubishi alone is said to have hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts at stake.
Mitsubishi Gets Orders  From China, J. COM.,  Mar. 26, 1980, at 10.
116  Mitsubishi  Mining to 4ssist China in Coal Venture, J. COM., Mar. 26,  1981,  at 33.  One im-
pediment to reaching a solution has been  China's insistence on receiving  more than 2.5 billion
dollars in low interest loans in return for making compensation.  Chinese Aide Assures  Japan on
Future Ties, Asian Wall  St.  J., Aug. 24,  1981,  at  8.  Latest reports indicate  that the Japanese
government has decided to provide the Chinese with a loan package  worth 1.21  billion dollars to
help salvage part of phase I of the Baoshan project and other industrial undertakings using Japa-
nese supplies.  Hashimoto, Japan  Sets $1.21 Billion Loan Package  For  Chinese  Steel, Petrochemical
Plants,  Asian Wall St.  J., Sept.  14, 1981,  at 3.
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worked out either in regulations or the joint venture documents them-
selves.
In essence, the law provides  for the establishment of equity joint
ventures between Chinese and foreign entities, subject to the authoriza-
tion of China's  Foreign  Investment  Control  Commission  (FICC).12 2
The ventures will take the form of limited liability companies.' 3  The
foreign participant must contribute at least 25% of the venture's regis-
tered capital." 4  That contribution may take any of a variety of forms,
including capital goods, industrial property rights or cash.'15  Theoreti-
cally, the foreign share can be as high as 100%.126  Profits and losses are
to be  divided according  to each party's capital contributions.2 7  With
the  exception  of the  site, which  the  Chinese  side  may  contribute  or
lease to the venture, the value of all such contributions must be jointly
ascertained. 28  Any technology  invested by the foreign party must be
both "truly advanced  and appropriate  to China's needs."' 2 9
Subject  to the "laws,  decrees  and pertinent rules and regulations
of" ' 3 0  the PRC, the joint venture is to be governed  by a Board of Di-
rectors, composed of individuals chosen by each party and headed by a
Chairman  appointed  by the Chinese  and one  or two  Vice  Chairmen
named by the foreign participant.' 31  The Board is to have authority to
act on "all issues concerning the venture,"'132 including, but not limited
to, production and business programs, labor plans and the appointment
of the president,  chief engineer,  treasurer  and auditors. 33  However,
"the production and business programs.  . . shall be filed with the au-
thority concerned and.  . . shall be implemented through business con-
tracts."' 34  First priority in the acquisition  of "required raw and semi-
processed materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc."  should be given to
Chinese  sources,  although a venture  will  be allowed to acquire  such
items abroad "with its own foreign exchange.' 35
122  Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art.  3.
123  Id  art. 4.
124  Id  art. 4.
125  Id  art. 5.
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The joint venture's gross income, after deductions for worker bo-
nus and welfare funds, expansion funds and reserve funds,136 is subject
to a "joint venture  income tax" imposed pursuant to the  "tax laws  of
the PRC."'13 7  Tax holidays are potentially available for joint ventures
equipped with "up-to-date technology by world standards" for the first
two  to three profit-making years, 1 38 as  are tax "incentives"  for those
reinvesting net profits in China.139  Through "the legislation in force,"
the Chinese government has vowed to protect all lawful rights and in-
terests  of the foreign participants  including  "resources  invested"  and
"profits due,"  which may be repatriated,  according to the law."4
The products manufactured by a joint venture may be distributed
in China as well as abroad14' throughout the term of the venture, as
agreed upon between the parties.1 42  The foreign venture partner has a
right, under certain circumstances, to terminate  the venture before its
expiration  date, provided  authorization  has  been  received  from  the
proper authorities. 143  Finally, disputes are to be resolved by the Board
of Directors "through consultation by the participants  on the principle
of equality and mutual benefit,"'"  and if that fails, through arbitra-
tion.145
The Joint Venture Law did not evoke the level of foreign interest
the Chinese leadership  initially had anticipated.1"  In some measure,
this  was  a  consequence  of the  many  questions  the  law  left  unan-
swered. 47  Responding to this criticism, the Chinese have accelerated
and intensified  their efforts to issue laws  and regulations fleshing  out
the basic Joint Venture Law.  To date, new laws or sets of regulations
concerning five key areas have been promulgated.  These concern joint
venture  income  tax,1 4 8  personal  income  tax,149 labor management, 150
136 Id  art. 7.
137  Id  art  7.
138  Id  art. 7.
139  Id  art. 7.
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the registration  of joint ventures 1' and foreign exchange. 152  Work re-
portedly  is progressing  in other related  areas,  including  a civil code,
civil  procedure  law,  further  foreign  exchange  regulations  and  re-
vamped patent and copyright laws.' 53  In addition, under a directive of
the Standing Committee  of the National People's  Congress issued on
November  29,  1979,  the validity of more than  1,500  laws, regulations
and directives issued prior to  1957, many of which may have an impact
upon joint ventures,  has been reaffirmed.'
54
Joint Venture Income Tax
China's  Income  Tax Law  Concerning  Joint  Ventures  With  Chi-
nese and Foreign Investment was formulated  after extensive  consulta-
tion with foreign business leaders and scholars and promulgated by the
Fifteenth Session of the National People's Congress Standing Commit-
tee on August  26,  1980.'"  Regulations  elaborating  the provisions  of
this law were issued on December  14,  1980.156  Akin to the basic Joint
and formally issued and made  effective  on September  10,  1980 [hereinafter cited  as Income Tax
Law].  A translation by Xinhua,  may be found  in MAIN  DOCUMENTS, supra note 103,  at 230.
149  Zhunghua  Renmin  Gungheguo  Geren  Suopeshuifa  (Individual Income Tax  Law of the
People's Republic  of China), adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth National  People's Con-
gress and formally issued and made effective  on September  10,  1980 [hereinafter cited as Individ-
ual Income Tax Law].  A translation by Xinhua may be found in MAIN  DOCUMENTS,  supra note
103,  at 238.
150  Zhongwai  Hezi Jingying  Qiye Laodong  Guanli Guiding  (Regulations  on Labor Manage-
ment in Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment), adopted at Fifteenth Session of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee  and formally  issued and made  effective on Au-
gust 26, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Labor Management Regulations].  A translation by Xinhua may
be found at E.  ASIAN  EXECUTIVE  REP.,  Oct.  15,  1980, at 26.
151  Zhongwai  Hezi  Jingying  Qiye  Denji  Guanli  Banfa  (Regulations  on  the Registration  of
Joint Ventures  using Chinese  and Foreign  Investment),  adopted at  the Fifteenth  Session of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and formally issued and made effective on Au-
gust 26,  1980  [hereinafter  cited  as Registration  Regulations].  A translation  by Xinhua  may be
found at E. ASIAN  EXECUTIVE  REP.,  Oct.  15,  1980,  at 25-26.
152  Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo Waihui Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (Provisional Regulations for
Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China),promulgated  by the State Council on  De-
cember  18,  1980 [hereinafter  cited as Exchange  Control Regulations].  A translation by  Xinhua
may  be found at CHINA  BUS.  REV.,  Mar.-Apr.  1981,  at 49-50.
153  See Alford,  note 31 supra, at 83-84.  The Chinese have  also recently promulgated  regula-
tions governing the activities of lawyers  and local offices of foreign businesses.
154  Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), reprinted  in FOREIGN  BROADCAST  INFORMATION  SERVICE
Nov. 30, 1979,  at L 3-4.  The directive provides that all such laws shall be in force, save for those
that clearly are in conflict with the Constitution of the PRC or any laws passed or decrees issued
by the Fifth National People's Congress.  See Torbert & Thomson, China's  Joint Venture Law: A
Preliminary  Anaoysis,  12  VAND.  J. TRANS.  L. 821  (1979).
155  Based on discussions  of co-author  Afford with Chinese officials,  Feb.  1981.
156  Zhonghua  Renmin  Gunghegua  Zhongwai  Hezi Jingying Qiye  Suodeshuifa Shixing  Xize
(Detailed Rules and Regulations  for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China), approved on December  10,  1980 by the State Council andpromulgated  by theVentures in the China Trade
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Venture Law in its brevity  and generality, the  Joint Venture  Income
Tax Law is a mere eighteen articles long.  It subjects joint ventures to
tax  on  net  income  derived  from  "production,  business  and  other
sources  by branches within or outside the territory of China.  . .after
deduction of costs, expenses  and losses." ' 7  The basic rate of taxation
is 30%,' 5" but the effective rate, inclusive of the local surtax of 10%, is
33%.1' 9  A further tax of 10% will be withheld on all income the foreign
participant chooses  to repatriate, 60  while a refund of 40% of income
taxes paid is available, if the income subject to taxation is reinvested in
a joint venture  for  a five-year period.161  Even  without the  potential
refund, the tax is comparable to the industrial and commercial income
tax to which Chinese entities without foreign investment are subject. 1 62
Joint ventures scheduled to operate for more than ten years are eligible
to receive tax holidays of 100% for their first profit making year,t63 50%
for the second and third such years," 6  and in the case of ventures en-
gaged in such "low profit operations as farming and forestry or located
in remote, economically underdeveloped areas,"  15% to 30% for an ad-
ditional ten years. 65
Separate formulae are laid out in the Regulations for computing
taxable income earned from industrial, commercial and service activi-
ties, while  "[flor  other lines of operations,"  reference  is to be made to
the most  appropriate  of these  three  categories. 166  In  each instance,
taxable income is defined  as the enterprise's income net of permissible
deductions.'67  Permissible  deductions  include  manufacturing,  selling
Ministry of Finance on December  14,  1980 [hereinafter cited as Detailed Rules and Regulations].
A translation  by Xinhua may be found  at CHINA  Bus.  REv.,  Mar.-Apr.  1981,  at 53-54.
157  Income Tax Law, supra note 148,  art.  1.
158  Id.  art. 3.  A lower rate is promised for joint ventures  searching for  and exploiting  petro-
leum, natural gas and mineral resources.  Id.  art.  3.
159  Id.  art. 3.  Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note  156, art. 3.  Local authorities  have
the authority  to waive part or all of the local surtax.
160  Income Tax Law, supra note  148,  art. 4.
161  Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156, art. 6.  The Tax Law itself does not specify
that the reinvestment  must be made  in a joint venture.
162 The net income of Chinese entities earning 10,000,uan  (approximately  $6,000)  or more a
year is subject to tax at a rate of 34.5%,  plus surtaxes which may run as high as 60%, leading to a
potential effective tax rate of 55.2%.  Reynolds, Doing Business with the Peopier  Republic of China:
Tax Considerations, 14 INT'L LAW.  49 (Winter,  1980).
163  Income Tax Law, supra note 143,  art. 5.
164 Id.  art. 5.  Losses may be carried forward for as many as five years.  Id.  art. 6.
165  Id.  arts. 8,  9.
166  Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note 156,  art. 8.
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and administrative expenses, taxes on sales, 68  wages and certain  other
costs  of  doing  business,
169  but  explicitly  exclude  capital  expendi-
tures,1 70  expenditures  on the purchase of intangible assets,  interest on
capital,17'  taxes  (other than taxes on sales),
172  penalties, losses covered
by insurance, 173 "donations and contributions other than those for pub-
lic welfare and relief purposes,"  and more than a very limited amount
of entertainment expenses. 174
Depreciation of fixed assets "shall generally be computed on aver-
age by the method of straight line,"' 75  although the joint venture may
seek permission to accelerate depreciation. 76  For purposes of comput-
ing depreciation,  the minimum useful life of houses  and buildings  is
twenty years,  "machines  and equipment and the facilities for the pur-
pose of production,"  ten  years,  and  electronic  equipment  and  most
means of transportation, five years. 177  Intangible assets  such as "tech-
nical know-how,  patent  rights,  ownership  of trade marks,  copyright,
ownership  of sites  and other  royalties used  as investment"  are  to be
amortized  over ten years,  unless  alternative periods  of use are set.'
7 8
"Expenses  arising during the period of preparation for a joint venture"
may also be amortized, provided not more than 20% of such costs are
deducted in any one year.'
7 9
Accounts are to be maintained on the accrual basis,'10  using First-
In-First-Out  (FIFO),  shifting  average  or weighted  average.'  Raw
materials,  finished  products,  by-products  and  inventories  are  to  be
computed "according  to the cost price."' 82  "Vouchers for accounting,
accounting  books  and reports"  are  to be kept  in Chinese  or in both
Chinese  and  a foreign  language  and  should  be retained  for  at  least
168  Id.  "Taxes on sales" here presumably refers to China's Consolidated Industrial and Com-
mercial Tax.  See text accompanying notes 286-294 infra.
169 Id.
170  Id.  art. 9.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.  Entertainment expenses  are deductible  only if "relevant to production  and operation"
and then only not "above the quota of three per thousand of the total sale income in the tax year
or above the quota of ten per thousand of the total operational income."
175 Id.  art. 10.
176  Id.  art.  13.
177  Id.
178  Id.  art.  16.
179  Id.  art.  17.
180 Id.  art. 23.
181  Id.  art.  18.
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fifteen years.'83  In addition, the Regulations  acknowledge  that an en-
terprise may choose to keep separate books for tax and financial pur-
poses.'
8 4
Taxes are to be reported for calendar years"'  on  annual returns1
8 6
accompanied by "reports on auditing by the chartered public account-
ants registered in the [PRC.' 1 87  Payment is to be made quarterly 8  in
Chinese currency at official exchange  rates.'8 9  Foreign tax credits  are
available for income tax paid "by a joint venture or its branch against
tax assessed" by the Chinese.190  The Ministry of Finance has the right
to interpret the tax law and regulations, 191 but amounts in dispute must
be paid before reconsideration is sought from such "higher tax authori-
ties"  or before the matter is brought  to court. 192  By  way  of enforce-
ment,  the tax  authorities  have  the  right "to  investigate the  financial
affairs,  account  work,  and  tax  situation"  of  any  joint  venture 
193-
although  they  must  maintain  the  confidentiality  of  such  informa-
tion'1 94 -and  the  right to impose  surcharges195  for overdue payments.
They may also exact penalties of as much as  five times the amount of
tax owed (up to a maximum penalty of 5,000yuan),196 and in instances
of "gross violations," may recommend prosecution under China's new
criminal law.  1
97
The Individual  Income Tax
Under the Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC and its imple-
menting  Regulations, 19  each  individual  residing  for  more than  five
183  Id.  art.  25.
184  Id.  art. 24.
185 Id.  art. 7.  The Gregorian calendar  is to be used.
186 Id. art. 20.
187  Id.
188  Id.  art.  15.
189 Id., art. 22.
190  Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art.  16; Pomp, Gelatt and Surrey,  The Evohing  Tax .Sys-
tem  of  the People rRepublic of China, 16 TEx. IN'L  L.J.  11,  69-77 (1981),  provides the best discus-
sion to date of-the creditability of taxes paid in China against U.S. taxes and taxes paid in the U.S.
against Chinese taxes.
191  Fields, Taxation:  The People's Republic of China Income Tax Laws, 22 HARV.  INT'L L.J.
234  (1981).
192 Income Tax  Law, supra note  148, art.  15.
193 Id.  art.  12.
194 Detailed  Rules and Regulations, supra note 156,  art. 27.
195  Income  Tax  Law, supra note  148,  art.  13.  The surcharge  to be  assessed for each day  in
arrears is one half of one percent of the amount owed.
196  Detailed Rules and Regulations, supra note  156, art. 27.
197  Income Tax  Law, supra note 148,  art.  14.
198  Zhonghua Renmin Gungheguo  Geren Suodeshuifa Shixing Xize (Detailed Rules and Reg-Northwestern  Journal  of
International  Law  & Business  3:56(1981)
years  in the PRC is subject to tax on his entire world-wide  income.199
Individuals residing in China for less than five years but more than 12
months  are subject to tax on income  earned in the PRC  and income
remitted  from abroad to the PRC. 200  Persons living in China for less
than one year but 90 days or more, are taxed only on "income gained
within China," ''  while those residing in the PRC for less than 90 con-
secutive  days  are exempt  from  Chinese  income  tax.2°2  Income  from
wages and salaries is taxed at specified rates ranging from 5% to 45%,2° 3
after a monthly deduction of 800 yuan (approximately $500).204  Given
that the average annual  income  in the PRC  is considerably  less than
800 yuan,2°5 the tax, in effect,  applies primarily to foreigners. °6  Per-
sonal service  income, royalties or rental income  is taxed at a flat 20%
rate,207  after  specified  deductions  for  residents  of the  PRC.  Income
from interest, dividends, bonuses  and other non-exempt  sources is as-
sessed  at a flat 20% without any deductions.20   Apart from providing
that income tax will be withheld at the source, if possible,2 9 the proce-
dural and enforcement aspects of this law closely approximate those of
the Joint Venture Income Tax Law.2'0
Labor  Management Relations
The Regulations on Labor Management  in Joint Ventures  Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment2"' set out general standards for deal-
ing with what are described as "labor management problems."' 2   Sub-
ject to these standards,2'3 joint venturers  are free to conclude contracts
ulations for the Implementation of the  Individual  Income Tax Law of the  People's Republic  of
China), approved by the State Council on December  10,  1980 andpromulgated  by the Ministry of
Finance on  December  14,  1980.  (Detailed  Rules and  Regulationsfor the Individual  Income Tax).
A translation by Xinhua may be  found at CHINA  Bus.  REV.,  Mar.-Apr.  1981,  at  55-56.
199 Id., art. 3.
200  Id.
201  Individual  Income Tax Law, supra note 149, art.  1.
202  Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Individual  Income Tax  Law, supra note  198, art. 5.
203  Individual Income Tax  Law, supra note  149, art. 3.
204  Id.  art. 5.
205  Personal  Incomes in China, CHINA  Bus.  REV., Mar.-Apr.  1981,  at 19-20.
206  Loong, China  Leaves Some GreyAreas, FAR E. ECON.  REv., Sept. 26, 1980, at 108.  Knowl-
edgeable observers  suggest that at present less than  100 citizens of the PRC will be subject to the
Individual Income  Tax.  Pomp, Gelatt and Surrey, supra note  190,  at n.170.
207  Individual Income Tax  Law, supra note  148,  arts. 3,  5.
208  Id.
209  Id.  art. 6.
210 Income  Tax Law, note 148 supra.
211  See Labor  Management  Regulations, supra note  150,  arts. 8-11.
212  Id.  art. 8.
213  Such standards  are subject to interpretation  by the State Bureau of Labor.  Id.  art.  15.Ventures in the China Trade
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with "the trade union organization formed in the joint venture,"'214 pro-
vided they implement  the "relevant rules and regulations  of the Chi-
nese government  on labor protection  and ensure safety in production
"215  Those contracts, which must be approved by the "labor man-
agement department  of the provincial,  autonomous, regional,  or mu-
nicipal people's government,"21 6 may address  "[m]atters  pertaining to
employment  [and]  dismissal.  . . of.  . .workers, tasks of production,
wages,  awards and punishment, working time and vacation, labor in-
surance  and welfare, labor protection and labor discipline."21 7
The general  standards  set forth in the  Labor Regulations permit
joint ventures to select workers  and staff members "through  examina-
tion for  their  qualifications. '21 8  Appropriate  labor management  de-
partments  must,  however,  approve  the  examinations  used,  or  the
recommendations  of local  authorities  must  be  obtained.2 19  Those
workers who "fail to meet requirements  after training and who are not
suitable for other work,"  together with "surplus workers,"  may be dis-
charged  according  to the Labor Regulations, provided they are given
"compensation." 22 0  Workers, too, have the right to sever their relation-
ship with the joint venture.221
In addition to setting broad parameters  for hiring  and firing,  the
Labor Regulations spell out wage and benefit standards.222  The wage
level for workers  and staff members employed by a joint venture  is to
be "120  to 150 percent of the real wages of the workers and staff mem-
bers of state-owned  enterprises  of the  same  trade in the locality," 223
although the venture's Board of Directors has discretion in determining
"wage  standards, the form of wages paid, and bonus and subsidy sys-
tems. 224  In terms of benefits, the Regulations require joint ventures to
"pay  for  the  Chinese  workers'  and  staff members'  labor  insutance,
[and]  cover  their medical  expenses  and various kinds  of government
subsidies  in line with  the standards  prevailing  in  state-owned  enter-
214  Id.  art. 2.
215  Id.  art.  13.
216  Id.  art. 2.
217  Id.
218  Id.  art. 3.
219  Id.
2 20 Id.  art. 4.
221  Id.  arL 7.
222  Id.  arts.  8-11.
223  Id.  art. 8.
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prises.' ' 22  Any  disputes arising between labor and management  are to
be  resolved  "through  consultation,"  if possible,226  and  if not, by  the
provincial level labor management department through arbitration  or
by the people's courts.227
Registration  Regulations
The Regulations on the Registration of Joint Ventures Using Chi-
nese  and  Foreign  Investment228  specify  various  registration  require-
ments for joint ventures.  The process  starts after FICC authorization,
with  registration  with  the  General  Administration  for  Industry  and
Commerce (GAIC).229  Then, the GAIC "authorizes  the administrative
bureaus  for  industry  and  commerce  in  the provinces,  municipalities
and  autonomous  regions"  to  register  the  joint  venture.230  Subse-
quently, the venture must open an account with the Bank of China23'
and register with the local tax bureau.232  It must give notice to FICC
and the provincial level Administration Bureau for Industry and Com-
merce "within  one month after approval by the  [FICC]"  of proposed
changes, such as moving to a new site, shifting production, increasing,
decreasing  or transferring  registered  capital  and extending  or  cutting
short  the term  of the  venture.233  To enable  the  GAIC  and its  local
counterparts  to  enforce  the  relevant  requirements,  the  Registration
Regulations authorize  these bodies to "supervise and inspect" the joint
venture and if need be, warn or fine it "in accordance with the varying
degrees of seriousness in each specific  case.""
Foreign Exchange Regulations
The  Provisional  Regulations  for  Exchange  Control  of the PRC,
which took effect on March  1, 198 1,235  endeavor to synchronize all for-
eign exchange  earnings and expenditures by routing  all transactions in
foreign exchange through accounts in the Bank of China and requiring
the approval of the State General Administration of Exchange  Control
225  Id.  art.  11.
226  Id.  art.  14.
227  Id.  Access  to the courts is available if either party "disagrees  to the arbitration."  Id.
228  See, Registration  Regulations, supra note  151.
229  Id.  art. 2.
230  Id.
231  Id.  art.  6.
232  Id.
233  Id.  art. 7.
234 Id.  art.  10.
235  See Exchange Control Regulations, supra note 152.Ventures in the China Trade
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(SGAEC).236  Article 22 of the Exchange Control Regulations requires
that "all foreign exchange receipts"  ofjoint ventures "be deposited with
the Bank of China" and that all "foreign exchange  disbursements"  of
these ventures  be paid only  "from their foreign exchange  deposit ac-
counts."237  A foreign joint venturer is entitled to remit its net profits
after taxes  only to the extent that the joint venture's  account with the
Bank of China contains the foreign exchange required, and then only if
the  SGAEC  has  approved  an  application  for  transfer.23 8  To ensure
that these restrictions are followed, the Exchange Control Regulations
also require that all joint ventures  submit "periodic  reports and state-
ments of their foreign exchange  business to the SGAEC,"  which will
have the power to review their activities3 9
The Foreign Exchange  Regulations  also apply  to "staff members
and workers of foreign nationality" employed by joint ventures.240  Ar-
ticle 25 prohibits  such persons  from remitting or otherwise taking out
of China in foreign  currency more than  50% of their "net wages  and
other legitimate earnings after tax."241
SOME OF THE  PROBLEMS  NOT  RESOLVED
By THE JOINT  VENTURE  LAWS
As both Chinese and experienced  Western  observers understand,
neither the Joint Venture Law, nor those laws and regulations designed
to elaborate various of its terms ultimately do more than provide a gen-
eral  framework. 2  It  should  come  as  no  surprise  then,  that  many
problems remain unresolved, and therefore, will have to be addressed
in the process of negotiating a joint venture  agreement.
Certainly,  the most  significant  obstacle  to  conclusion  of a joint
venture in China is the scarcity of foreign exchange.243  This problem,
of course, could not be overcome by the Joint Venture Law or the sur-
rounding legal and regulatory requirements.  It can be dealt with only
through  creative use of the venture  as a means of generating foreign
exchange, directly or indirectly, or by otherwise identifying  sources of
hard currency which  can be linked or teamed with the venture.  Sug-
236 Id. art. 22.
237  Id.
238 Id.  art. 24.
239 Id.  art. 22.
240  Id.  art. 25.
241  Id.
242  Hsia & Haun, supra note 102, at 77-83.
243  Kaulfnan, Euphoria  on China  Yields to Realism at Trade  Seminar, Wall St. J., Feb. 25,  1980,
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gestions in this connection are made later in this article.2'
Turning  then to some of the other potential stumbling  blocks in
the path of the prospective joint venture partner, we would identify the
following  considerations,  which  call  for  considerable  advance
planning.
Living with the Bureaucracy
There is simply no escaping the fact that a joint venture will have
to  deal continually  with China's large  and slow-moving  bureaucracy.
Government bureaucrats  have  much  to say, not only  about the joint
venture's interaction with the general economy, but also as to the man-
agement  of the venture  itself.  Under  Article  6  of the  Joint  Venture
Law, a joint venture must be governed by its Board of Directors, which
has responsibility  over such matters as procurement,  production,  em-
ployment  and marketing.245  This  seemingly  broad grant  of manage-
ment discretion  has been  significantly constrained  by the  Labor  and
Registration  Regulations.  According  to the  Labor  Regulations, joint
ventures must negotiate with state controlled labor unions for contracts
that  meet  prescribed  wage  and benefit  levels  and  conform  with  the
rules governing  worker  welfare, hiring  and discharges.246  These  con-
tracts are then subject to provincial and local government approval.247
Under the Registration  Regulations,  a joint  venture must obtain a li-
cense from the local office of the GAIC before it can do business, even
though it has already  received FICC approval. 248  Amendments to an
approved  joint  venture  agreement  and  other  significant  changes  in
business  operations  must  pass  muster  with  both  the  FICC  and  the
GAIC.
24 9
Of far greater  importance  than these formal,  legal restraints  are
those limitations on the autonomy of the Joint Venture's Board which
are  certain to  result  from  the entity's  inevitable  interaction  with  the
Chinese  bureaucracy.250  As experience  to  date  demonstrates,  a  pro-
spective foreign venture partner's determination will be sorely tested by
having to deal with a welter of bureaucracies,  at the central, provincial
244 See text accompanying  notes 364-381  infra.
245  See Joint Venture  Law, supra note  1, art. 6.
246  See Labor Management  Regulations, supra note 150,  arts.  3-8,  10,  11.
247  Id.  art. 2.
248  See Registration  Regulations, supra note  151,  art. 2.
249 Id.  art. 7.
250  Ludlow,  Wf/ho  the Boss?  After Ten Years They Still  Don't Know,  CHINA  Bus.  REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1981,  at  14;  Garcia,  China Trade Optimism Tempered, J. COM.,  Nov. 4,  1980, at  10.Ventures in the China Trade
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and local levels.25  Each of these entities has a defined area of respon-
sibility and competence, which it guards closely. 2  Intra-governmental
coordination is often not in evidence, even when there is no apparent
conflict of objectives  or jurisdiction. 3
In many respects, the process of negotiating one's way through this
bureaucratic maze to form a joint venture is good training for what lies
ahead when the joint venture does business in the predominantly state-
controlled Chinese economy.  The game starts, in effect, with the pro-
cess of negotiating a joint venture agreement.  Here too, there are mul-
tiple players on the Chinese  side and much confusion.
For example, the China International Trust and Investment Com-
pany (CITIC) was established in the autumn of 1979 to act as a broker,
matching  prospective  foreign ventures  with suitable  Chinese partners
and serving as a general ombudsman in solving the problems that arise
as joint venture arrangements are negotiated.2 5 4  Yet despite the highly
publicized  foreign  travels  of its  Chairman,  former  capitalist  Rong
Yiren,2 55 CITIC's functions  so far appear to be peripheral rather than
central,  designed  as  much to reassure  foreign investers  as to actually
resolve  major problems.  Established in 1979,  the FICC plays a more
substantive role.256  Headed by Vice Premier Gu Mu, who has been a
key figure  in China's  macroeconomic  planning, 25 7  the FICC  has  re-
viewed proposed joint venture arrangements with much closer scrutiny
and for a longer  period than foreign observers  originally  considered
would be the case.  The FICC has even suggested that changes be made
in joint venture  documents." 8  Once the  FICC has approved  a joint
venture, the relevant documentation 259 must be registered with a third
entity, the GAIC.260
In addition to these three organizations, which constitute the joint
251  Ludlow, supra note 250, at  14.
252 Id.
253  See Hsia & Hann, supra note 102,  at 79-83.
254 Statute of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, adopted by the State
Council and formally  issued  and made  effective  on  Oct. 4,  1979.  A  translation  by  Xinhua is
reprinted in SELLING  TECHNOLOGY  TO CHINA  297-300 (N. Ludlow  ed.  1979);  Ling, The Invest-
ment Matchmaker,  CHINA  TRADE  REP., July  1980, at 2.
255  [1979]  278  INT'L TRADE  REPORTER'S U.S. ExPoRT WEEKLY  (BNA), at C-2.
256  The PRC's Investment Control and  Import-Export Commissions, CHINA  Bus.  REV.,  Mar.-
Apr.  1980,  at  12-13.
257  D.  KLEIN  & A.  CLARK,  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY  OF  CHINESE  COMMUNISM  447-448
(1971).
258  Birenbaum & Afford, supra note 3,  at 26-27.
259  Joint Venture  Law, supra note I,  art. 3.
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venture bureaucracy on the national level, there are a growing number
of provincial  level  entities  with at  least partial jurisdiction  over joint
ventures.  These include but are not limited to "the [provincial and lo-
cal]  authorities  with whom  each joint venture's production  and busi-
ness  programs"  must  be  filed261  and  such  specialized  entities  as the
Guangdong  Provincial  Administrative  Committee  in  Charge  of the
Special Economic Zones, the Fujian Investment and Enterprise  Corpo-
ration, the Beijing Economic Development  Corporation, the Shanghai
Foreign Investment Commission, the Zhejiang Province Overseas Chi-
nese Investment  Corporation and the local arms of the GAIC.262
Problems of bureaucratic  coordination are not hypothetical.  Pro-
spective joint venturers  have been strongly encouraged by central gov-
ernment bureaus, only to learn that a provincial agency is on the verge
of concluding  an  agreement with a competitor or that basic  require-
ments such as power and water are not available.263  Recent  efforts at
decentralizing  economic  responsibility  and  promoting  financial  ac-
countability,  however shortlived they may be, are a mixed blessing in
this connection.  Joint venturers may have more freedom to make deci-
sions  formerly  reserved  to central  authorities, but the number of bu-
reaucracies  in the act seems certain to increase.
Working with the Chinese Worker
Notwithstanding the Labor Regulations, many questions concern-
ing relations with the Chinese  work force  remain unanswered.  These
questions  assume  considerable importance  because joint ventures  are
required  to  provide  salaries  for  their  workers  at  a level  appreciably
greater  than workers  in comparable  Chinese enterprises. 64  This  will
reduce the advantage  of locating in the PRC compared with elsewhere
in Asia,2 65 although in all likelihood, these premiums will not be passed
along by Chinese authorities to workers  in joint ventures.266
The principal  problems  yet to be resolved  concern  the  selection,
quality,  size  and control  of the  work  force.  Since  the Joint  Venture
Law  was promulgated,  Chinese leaders have indicated that joint ven-
tures would  be able to  draw their workers  from  a select pool of spe-
261  Joint Venture  Law, supra note  1, art. 9.
262  Loong, Special Zones, SpecialRules, FAR E. ECON. REV.,  Sept. 12,  1980, at 56.  Guangdong
Sheng Jingji Tequ Tiaoli (Regulations on Special Economic  Zones in Guangdong  Province).
263  Weil, Technology Transfer, CHINA  Bus.  Rav.,  Mar.-Apr. 1981,  at 21-29.
264  See Labor Management  Regulations, supra note  150, art. 8,  11.
265  D. BONAVIA,  THE  CHINESE 200  (1980).
266  Hsia & Haun, supra note 102, at 77-83(quoting Liu Yaochu).Ventures in the China Trade
3:56(1981)
cially, trained  workers. 267  The  Labor  Regulations  do  grant  joint
ventures the right to choose workers on the basis of tests approved by
local  labor  management  bureaus. 2 68  Still,  doubts  remain  as  to  the
number of reasonably well trained Chinese staff and workers, the will-
ingness of local labor bureaus to make them available for joint venture
enterprises  and  the  nature  of the job  selection  tests  to be  adminis-
tered.269
The suitability of the available work force is of particular  impor-
tance for prospective foreign joint venturers because the West's experi-
ence  with Chinese  quality control has been mixed. 27°  When they buy
abroad,  the  Chinese  have  insisted  on  thorough  inspections  coupled
with comprehensive representations  and warranties,27'  but the Chinese
have been  reluctant to provide  the same treatment for exports  of do-
mestic  manufactured  goods.272  Recently,  however,  preshipment  in-
spections  by  foreign buyers  have  been  permitted.  These  inspections
have  proved  necessary,  as  the  quality  of Chinese  manufacturers  in
many fields  has been  uneven and foreign insistence  on quality  assur-
ance has all too often been ignored by the Chinese. 273
Quality control is not the only potential concern.  There is an over-
abundance of unskilled Chinese workers or as the Chinese euphemisti-
cally  term  them,  "youth  waiting  for  work"  (daiye jingnian). 274
Overstaffing and low productivity are serious and widespread problems
particularly  for  Chinese  factory  managers  who  have  to  account  for
profits and losses.2 75  The Labor Regulations empower state authorities
to approve virtually every aspect of the labor contracts with the appro-
priate Chinese labor unions, so it is hard to imagine that joint ventures
could somehow  escape the employment  problems plaguing China.
27 6
267  Based on an interview  of Vice  Premier Yao Ilin by co-author Alford  in Aug.  1979.
268  Labor Management  Regulations, supra note  150, art. 3.
269  LaForce, Joint  Ventures  and Labor  Relations:  A Preliminary  Analysis  of China's  Joint
Venture Labor Regulations  (Jan. 1981)  (unpublished paper available through the  co-authors).
270  Rosenbaum,  Chinese Products Stir Complaints,  J. CoM.,  Nov.  10,  1980, at  1.
271  See,  e.g.,  the purchase  contracts  typically employed  by  MACHIMPEX,  reprinted in  NA-
TIONAL  COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA  TRADE,  CHINA'S STANDARD  FORM CONTRACTS  AND  RELATED
LEGAL ISSUES  IN U.S.-CHiNA  TRADE  (Special Report No.  13,  1975).
272  Theroux, Technology  Sales to China:"  New Laws and Old Problems,  14 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
185,  222-224 (1980).
273  See Rosenbaum, supra note 270, at  1.
274 Vice  Premier  Li Xiannian  reportedly  has set  the number  of unemployed  at more than
20,000,000.  J. Wang, China'r Jobless  Youths:  4 Mounting Problem,  N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,  1979,
§F, at  11.
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The greatest challenge  presented by the employment  situation  in
China is not one which any legislation or regulation can effectively  ad-
dress.  It is one familiar to businesspersons everywhere-how  to moti-
vate  the workforce.  Notwithstanding  all  the  claims  to the  contrary,
Chinese workers are not immune from motivational ailments.  Absen-
teeism, low productivity  and indifference have been  all too evident  in
Chinese industry during the past decade.277  The policy of the present
political leadership to provide material incentives, particularly bonuses,
has helped, but the problem remains a serious one.  The Labor Regula-
tions  authorize joint ventures  to  deliver  bonuses  and  dismiss  work-
ers.
278  The effective use of these carrots and sticks to motivate workers
in one of the world's  most socialist  environments  will  require excep-
tional management skills.
Unresolved Tax Issues
The Joint Venture  Income Tax  Law and  the Individual Income
Tax Law lay  down the basic ground  rules and as such,  are welcome
complements to the Joint Venture Law.  Yet, even when supplemented
by  their  respective  sets  of implementing  regulations,2 7 9  each  leaves
many  questions  unanswered  both as  to the  manner in which  a joint
venture  or foreign national's  income  will be taxed, the mechanics  for
securing one's full rights under the law, and the potential applicability
of other Chinese taxes.
The most obvious  questions  remaining about the income  tax are
definitional  and jurisdictional.  Such  fundamental  terms  as  "costs,"
"losses,"  "remitted"  and  "residing"  are not fully  defined,  as a conse-
quence of which it is difficult to compute net income.280  The question
of whether the term "joint venture"  should be read to include compen-
sation trade or coproduction agreements that have extensive foreign in-
volvement,  if  not  foreign  investment,  is  unanswered.2 81  A  third
outstanding issue involves breadth.  For example, the Joint Venture In-
277  Id.  at 23-24.
278  Labor Management  Regulations, supra note  150, art. 9.  Notwithstanding  the fact that the
Labor Management  Regulations  authorize joint ventures  to discharge  inadequate workers, it  is
hard  to imagine  that  foreign-owned  enterprises  will  be  able  to  end the  concept of the  "iron
ricebowl"--the  idea that, once employed,  a worker and his factory form  a virtually  inalienable
bond.
279 See Detailed Rules  and Regulations,  note  156 supra; Detailed Rules  and Regulations  for
the Individual  Income Tax Law, supra note 198.
280 See Fields, supra note  191,  at 238.
281  See Income Tax Law, supra note 148, art. 1.  Recent reports suggest that the Chinese intend
to apply  a separate, higher rate of income  tax  to enterprises  in China with considerable foreign
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come Tax leaves unclear its relation to the income tax, to be imposed at
the  rate  of  15%  by the  Regulations  on  Special  Economic  Zones  in
Quangdong  Province on joint ventures established in those zones.2 8 2
A related  problem concerns  multiple taxation.  Xue Muqiao, the
noted economist whose writings have reportedly had  a great influence
upon the current leadership,8 3 recently  asserted  that the 33% rate  es-
tablished by the Joint Venture Income Tax Law might be reduced in
particular cases to avoid excessive, aggregate taxation.284  Yet the rela-
tionship between other Chinese taxes and the special joint venture in-
come tax regime remains unclear, raising the spectre of heavy, multiple
taxation.  In addition to the income tax, China has at least ten distinct
taxes, certain of which may apply to joint ventures and their owners.285
The most important  is the  Consolidated  Industrial  and  Commercial
Tax.216  A composite of four separate taxes, the consolidated tax-akin
to a cascading turnover tax287 -- in essence taxes goods and services  at
the stages of production and retail sales.288  Calculated  on the item's
sales price inclusive of tax, the tax can be passed on to purchasers to the
extent that the state will permit it to be reflected in the item's price.289
Although the rates vary according  to the importance of the goods and
services  involved29  and the  location  of the  taxpaying  enterprise,
2 9 1
they can run as high  as  66%  of an item's value:  thereby making the
question  of whether it will apply to a joint venture anything but aca-
demic. 292  Preliminary  indications  from negotiations held thus far are
that  contributions  from  foreign  partners  will  not  be  subject  to  the
tax.293  The provision  in the Income  Tax Regulations  permitting  the
deduction of taxes on sales does suggest, however, that the products of
a joint venture factory will be subject to this tax, barring a negotiated
282  See Loong, supra note  262, at 56-57; Pomp.  Gelatt and Surrey, supra note  190, at 63-66.
283  P.  Loong, Capitalising  on New Socialism, FAR E. ECON.  REV.,  Aug.  15,  1980, at 40-41.
284 Interview  with Xue Magiao,  CHINA Bus. REv. 58-60 (July-Aug.  1981); Kramer, Chinese Offi-
cial Says Tax on Earnings  of  Foreign  Investors  Likely to be Cut, Asian Wall St. J., Oct.  13,  1980, at
5.
285  Pomp & Surrey,  The Tax Structure of  the People'r  Republic of China, 20 VA. J. INT'L L.  1
(1979).
286  Pomp & Surrey, supra note 285, at 12-22; Gelatt,  The Consolidated  Industrial  and  Commer-
cial  Tax: Its Impact on Foreign  Investment, 2 E. ASIAN  EXECUTIVE  REP. 2 (1980).
287  Gelatt, supra note 286, at 2.
288  Id.
289 Id.
290 Luxury goods are taxed far more heavily than necessities.  Reynolds, supra note  162, at 57-
58.
291  Tax relief is available for entities situated in areas of unemployment.  See Pomp, Gelatt &
Surrey, supra note 190, at n.38.
292  Id.
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exemption.294
Apart from these substaltive  issues, the new tax laws and regula-
tions raise a number of vital concerns of an administrative or procedu-
ral nature.  As  presently  written,  neither the  law nor the  regulations
provides a means to obtain advance rulings or contest tax assessments
prior  to  making  payment.295  This  deficiency  is  accentuated  by  the
surcharge provisions of the laws.  These may be  triggered for "failure
to pay within the prescribed time limit,"  even, apparently, if the tax-
payer is taking issue with or in doubt  as to the amount of tax due.296
Additionally,  the laws  and  regulations  are vague  as to a number  of
procedural matters of importance to foreign investors, such as tax holi-
days or credits.  Taking the former as an example, beyond setting out a
very general  standard,  little is said about  the criteria  or methods for
securing  tax holidays.297  How,  after  all,  is  the  determination  to  be
made that technology provided by a foreign investor is truly advanced
by world standards and appropriate to China's needs, as the Joint Ven-
ture Law says is necessary to take a tax holiday?298  How, for example,
is a foreign investor to receive binding confirmation that a tax holiday
will  be  granted  before  actually  making  its  investment?  What docu-
ments are to be submitted, by whom, to whom, and when?  In practice,
answers to many of these questions may be negotiated out between the
parties, but the on-going  lack of clear, firm, visible  rules in this area
hardly serves as an incentive to prospective  foreign partners.
Bringing  the Profits Back Home
The Joint Venture  Law  entitles  foreign  participants  to repatriate
profits earned in China.
2 99  Yet potential foreign investors remain con-
cerned over the extent to which this promise will be effected in practice.
As  discussed  above, China lacks  sufficient foreign exchange to under-
take significant foreign procurements, and because of her historical ex-
perience,  is reluctant  to  borrow heavily  in foreign markets  to finance
imports of Western  goods and technology."°  Of late, the central gov-
ernment has come to appreciate the magnitude of this problem and has
intensified its efforts to discourage Chinese  and foreign investors alike
294 See  Rules and  Regulations, supra note  156,  art. 8.
295  Income Tax  Law, supra note  148,  arts. 8,  13.
296  Id.  art.  13;  Individual  Income Tax  Law, supra note  149,  art.  11.
297  Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 7; Income Tax Law, supra note 148, arts. 5,  6; Detailed
Rules and Regulations,  supra note  156,  arts.  5, 6.
298  Id.
299  Joint Venture  Law, supra note  1, art.  10.
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from moving foreign exchange  outside of China.3°'  Through the Joint
Venture  Income  Tax Law,3°2  the  Government  has imposed  an addi-
tional  10%  withholding  tax upon  net  earnings  repatriated  by foreign
joint venture participants, while through the Exchange Control Regula-
tions, it has sought to  limit each joint venture's  foreign exchange  dis-
bursements  to  its  foreign  exchange  earnings.303  Additionally,  in  its
most important currency conversion  action, the Government, in Janu-
ary of 1981,  carried out what  was effectively the PRC's  first devalua-
tion. 3 °  Under the new system, the rate of exchange  for Chinese state
enterprises  and government  corporations  purchasing foreign currency
to pay for overseas transactions is fixed at 2.8yuan per dollar, although
the rate for yuan received  in exchange  per foreign dollar earned will
stay at 1.5.305  As a result, China's exports are now more competitively
priced  on the world market, but correspondingly, the price of imports
has risen by almost 50%.306  And, notwithstanding protests by Japanese
and other trading  partners,  the  Chinese  have  continued  to  cut  back
drastically on major projects because of foreign exchange problems. 30 7
Protecting  Intellectual  Property  Rights
The Joint Venture Law does not explicitly provide for the protec-
tion of intellectual property.  Article 5 of the Law, however, recognizes
that a foreign participant's contribution to a joint venture may be in the
form of intellectual  property  rights,  thereby  acknowledging  that such
rights  are a valued  form of property.3 0 8  Article  2 of the Law asserts
that the Chinese government  will respect  and protect foreign  partici-
pants' legitimate property rights and interests; a category that in light of
Article 5, presumably  includes intellectual property rights.30 9
At present, the Chinese lack a comprehensive statutory framework
for the protection of intellectual property rights.  To be sure, China has
trademark' 0  and invention  laws.3 It  Pursuant to the  Law  on Trade-
301  Ludlow, China  Wire,  CHINA  Bus.  REv., Mar.-Apr.  1981,  at 3.
302  Income Tax Law, supra note  148,  art. 4.
303  Exchange  Control Regulations, supra note  152,  arts. 22-24.
304  Dessertine,  In  Double Taux de Change, COMITE  FRANCE  CHINE,  Dec.  19,  1980;  Ching,
China Confirms Separate  Currency  Rate  to be Set Internallyfor  Foreign Trade, Wall St. J., Dec. 16,
1980,  at 37.
305  Ching, supra note 304, at 37.
306 Id.
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308  Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
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marks, which was initially issued in  1963,  registration and a degree of
protection have been obtained for certain well-known American marks,
such as "The Encyclopedia Britannica. 312  Issued late in 1978, China's
revised Regulations  on Rewards for Inventions  reward  only those in-
ventors who  turn  their inventions  over to  the state  which then  may
make them available to any Chinese  entity. 13  As such, the invention
law offers little comfort for potential foreign joint venture participants
seeking  to protect their intellectual property rights.
As they have pledged to do in Article VI of their Trade Agreement
with the United  States, the Chinese  are endeavoring in short order to
put into  effect patent and copyright  laws that meet the minimal stan-
dards of the World Intellectual  Property Organization (WIPO). 314  To-
ward  that  end,  China  joined  WIPO  in  February  of  1980.311  In
addition, study groups have gone to Japan, the United States and other
major industrial  nations, and patent  specialists  have been  sent to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office for extended stays.316  Even
prior to the promulgation of the Joint Venture Law, it had been antici-
pated that the  Chinese would  issue laws of their own meeting WIPO
standards and might accede to the Paris Convention.317  They have not
yet done either, but these laws are rumored now to be in the final stage
of drafting.318  It has been suggested that in drafting their patent law,
the Chinese are looking toward the model emanating  from the United
Nations Conference on Trade  and Development  in their drafting.319
In the absence of comprehensive laws protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights, the only alternative means of safeguarding such interests is
by so providing in the joint venture agreement.  That is difficult to do.
1963.  A translation by Xinhua  may be found  at G. Hsi o, THE FOREIGN TRADE  OF  CHINA 219
(1977).  [Hereinafter cited as Hsiao].
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As Western companies are increasingly coming to learn through exam-
ples  such  as the  "708"--supposedly  a pirated  version  of the  Boeing
70732 -- China's  considerable  reputation  for honoring  foreign  patent
rights is not without  its  exceptions,  for which  there is little  practical
remedy.321  The situation is even more problematic when  it comes to
non-patentable  technical and managerial expertise.
As experience suggests, the proprietary nature of intangible infor-
mation is one of the more elusive concepts in the Sino-American  com-
mercial dialogue.322  This should not be surprising since the upholding
of rights to unpatented know-how can  entail barring technicians  from
using for the benefit  of the state information  they obtained from for-
eign sources, even though the information has been fully absorbed in
their general body of knowledge.  Such  a dichotomy in allegiances  is
unlikely to prove acceptable  to the  Chinese, since  it runs counter not
only to  Communist  ideology, but  to traditional  Chinese thought,  as
well.
323
These  problems  go  beyond  the  conceptual  level.  Despite-or,
maybe, because of-the post-Mao opening to the West, China's leaders
continue to worry that excessive reliance  on imported equipment will
impair her independence.324  Imports of goods entail greater levels  of
foreign debt and dependence on foreign supplies.  Present policy favors
the acquisition  of technology  and know-how, on  the theory that this
will enable the next generation to fend for itself.32 5  Is it little wonder,
then, that the Chinese could, for example, promise to protect the confi-
dentiality of foreign technology imparted to a particular factory's man-
agement, while insisting on the right to rotate chief engineers in order
to disseminate that very technology?
32 6
Living in China
The Joint Venture Law purports to assure that needed foreign per-
sonnel will be able to take up residence  in China.  The Law, however,
says nothing about the circumstances of their stay.  As discussed above,
320 Mathews,  China Set to Clone a  '708'From  Boeing Jet it Bought, Wash. Post, May 9,  1980,
§ A, at I.
321  Id.
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the Personal Income Tax Law establishes basic rules of taxation  appli-
cable to  resident aliens,3 27  and the Exchange  Control Regulations  re-
strict  the  amount  of  net  wages  a  foreign  worker  can  remit  from
China.32  The Consular Agreement between the United States and the
PRC assures Americans residing in China such basic privileges as noti-
fication of the consul within four days of arrest or detention, a visit by a
consular official within two days of notification, and attendence by two
consular  officials  at any trial in order to provide necessary  legal and
translation  assistance.329  Nonetheless,  fundamental  issues,  largely  of
an extralegal nature, remain.
The paramount problems concern the basics of living and working
in China as an alien.  For example, provision must be made for access
to housing, education, food and medical services at a standard that ulti-
mately will be  vastly superior  to what  is available  to Chinese work-
ers.330  Yet every effort must be made to prevent  this privileged  status
from  unleashing  a xenophobic  reaction.  Perhaps  a  more immediate
threat is the impact on Chinese society of such blatant discrimination in
the provision  of material benefits.  For as Orville  Schell's  fascinating
recent study of the underside of China's new openness  to the West-
replete with prostitutes,  pimps and punks in fedora hats-indicates, 33'
and as the recent regulations restricting the acceptance by Chinese offi-
cials of gifts from foreigners confirm,332 the influence of foreigners resi-
dent in China has not been entirely salutary.
Resolving Disputes with the Chinese Venture Partner
Perhaps to a greater extent than any other single issue in the joint
venture area, the approach to dispute resolution taken in the Joint Ven-
ture Law  shows the  sway  of classical  Chinese  culture, intensified  by
Communist ideology.  The Law  directs the parties  to resolve their dis-
putes through consultation on the bases of "equality and mutual bene-
fit," informal mediation and, as a last resort, formal arbitration.333  No
327  See  text accompanying notes  98-227 supra.
328  See  text accompanying notes 240-241  supra.
329  Consular Convention  Between the United  States of America and The People's Republic of
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mention is made of China's new economic courts. 334  This policy effec-
tuates  the long-standing  Chinese preference  for resolution  of disputes
informally through compromise, rather than litigation. 335  Rarely dur-
ing the past thirty years have  trade  disputes been referred to arbitra-
tion, let alone litigation, whether in China or abroad. 336
The  Chinese  have  agreed  in  recent  years  to  arbitration  clauses
specifying  foreign  sites,  including  Stockholm  (most  often),  Geneva,
London and Toronto.337  Generally, if unable to bring  the arbitration
under the rules of China's  Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission,338
the Chinese have indicated a preference for the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
rules, rather than those of the International Chamber of Commerce, to
which Taiwan  still belongs. 339
The Information Gap
The Hung-wu Emperor, founder of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1368-
1644),  reputedly refused to make public the basic laws regulating  the
behavior  of his  subjects.  He thought that  by publicizing  the laws he
would only encourage  those of mean spirit to circumvent  them.  The
present day  successors  of the Hung-wu Emperor have  retained more
than vestiges of that approach.  To be sure, during the past two years
the Chinese government has made unprecedented  strides in educating
the public  about  the basic  criminal  and  other  laws  that  affect  their
lives.340  Still, especially in the economic area, the nature and extent  of
Chinese law or those rules, regulations and directives having the effect
of law remains shrouded in secrecy.34'
In part because of foreign persistence, the Chinese government is
now in the process  of publishing  a  compendium of major  economic
laws.342  That work is certain  to be helpful,  yet it will  still  leave the
334  The role and procedures of these new courts are discussed in Ellis & Shea, Foreign  Commer-
cial Dispute Settlement in the Peopler  Bs  epublic of China, 6 INT'L  TRADE L.J. 155,  168-172  (1980-
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would-be  foreign joint venturer partially  in the  dark,  for it  will  not
cover provincial, municipal or local legal pronouncements,  such as the
rules  of the  provincial  labor  management  departments.  Nor  will  it
identify internal directives  and pronouncements,  such as the standards
of review by the FICC of petitions for changes in a joint venture's oper-
ations, which may not be called "law," but will nonetheless be binding
when applied.
STRUCTURING  AN APPROACH  TO THE  CHINESE
The Chinese are well aware of the difficulties facing potential for-
eign  investors.  To  Westerners  frustrated  with  the  pace  of  China's
movement toward more comprehensive  and detailed  laws in the joint
venture area, they counsel patience:  patience while a poor China, with
many competing  developmental  needs,  establishes priorities, patience
while  China learns from  her experience  in obtaining goods  and tech-
nology from foreign suppliers and patience  while China decides what
further laws and regulations governing joint ventures it is prepared to
adopt, although  it is  a safe bet they will be neither  as  many, nor as
specific,  as most  foreign venturers  would  desire.343  The  Chinese  are
right to counsel patience, for without great patience, a foreign company
would  be ill-advised to involve itself in a joint venture  with the Chi-
nese.
Reasonsfor  Investing in China
Given these daunting difficulties, why should a potential joint ven-
turer invest in China?  We see four major reasons.
The  first  is  access  to  China's  domestic  markets.  The  image  of
more than one billion Chinese  hungry for long-denied Western goods
casts  a powerful  spell.  Today's  would-be  China  tycoons,  like  their
predecessors a century ago, are enthralled by the prospect of "supply-
ing oil for the lamps of China."3"  For the most part, these dreams of
millions of new consumers  of  jeans and junk food are just that; fanta-
sies which the Chinese cannot now afford.345  Yet for entrepreneurs in
the electrical, transportation,  energy and agricultural industries, access
to the domestic market through the joint venture mechanism is a possi-
bility worth exploring.  These are fields which the Chinese want to de-
velop  as  part  of  the  new,  pragmatic  leap  forward.  Even  more
343 Powers,  China Interested in Mississopi Crops, says Chinese Ambassador, Jackson  Daily
News (Miss.), Jan. 25,  1981,  § B, at 4.
344  BONAVIA, supra note 265, at  199.
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importantly, such projects have the potential for generating foreign ex-
change through exports.
A second rationale is to exploit the growing  market for tourism.
Here, too, the objectives  of the  Chinese  and the  foreign investor  are
congruent.  The  commercial  prospects  are encouraging.  In  1980,  the
number of foreign visitors to the PRC soared to almost  6,000,000;346
and this despite increases in hotel, food and related travel prices that
have  run ahead  of China's  official  6%  inflation  rate.3 47  The foreign
business and journalistic communities have been other sources of busi-
ness for hotel, office  and similar projects.34 8
Many  of the joint venture  proposals  that  have received  serious
consideration involve tourism in one way or another.  Three of the first
five joint venture  proposals  approved  by the  FICC  seek to tap  this
growing market.  The most noteworthy of these ventures was the agree-
ment between E-S  Pacific  Development  and the  China  International
Travel Service to build and operate a flagship, international-class hotel
in Beijing to be known as "The Great, Wall."
349
China's  massive but  largely  untapped  raw material  wealth pro-
vides a third attraction for American  companies.  To be sure, the no-
tion that China would  soon become  a large-scale exporter  of oil has
faded in the face of domestic political wrangling,35° production  short-
falls 351 and the  disappointing  composition  of Chinese  oi.352  Indeed,
recent reports suggest that the Chinese are trying to import oil to keep
major  petrochemical  projects  alive.353  Still,  to  the  capitalist  world,
which  has  seen  supplies  of tin,  manganese,  tantalum,  tungstun  and
many other critical  metals  and minerals  dwindle  or come  under  the
control of unstable  third world suppliers or cartels,  China's vast min-
eral reserves  retain  a powerful  attraction,  particularly  since Western
technology would be of great value to the Chinese in extracting  those
346  State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, Communique on Fulfillment of
1980 National Economic Plan, issued April 29,  1981  by the State  Statistical Bureau, reprinted  in
BEUING REv.,  May  18,  1981, at 17.
347  Kramer, Currency-Starved  Chinese Charge Visitors Whatever Market Will Bearfor Services,
Wall  St. J., July  25,  1980, at 34; Modernization's Black Side, supra note 332 at  15.
348  China Trade Projects  Hard  to Come By, J.  COM.,  Nov.  19,  1980, at 1.
349  See Birenbaum & Alford, supra note 3.
350  Breeze, Safet  First  in Industry, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Oct. 10, 1980, at 61; Petroleum  Minister
Ousted  in China, J. COM.,  Aug. 20, 1980, at 2.
351  O  & Coal-  .4  New Shockerfrom Peking, ASLAWEEK,  Feb. 27, 1981,  at 43.
352 Alford, Practical and Legal Problems of Doing Business with China (Sept. 27, 1979) (speech
delivered at the Federal Bar Association Annual Convention, San Antonio, Texas).  Most Chinese
petroleum has such a high paraffin content that it would be unsuitable for the American or Euro-
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natural  resources.354  Again,  the crucial  foreign  exchange  problem  is
potentially  soluble, at least in principle  and over time.
The fourth, and for many the most alluring  appeal of joint ven-
tures in China is the Chinese people and their tremendous potential as
a labor  force  to  produce  goods  for  export  markets.  During the  past
three years,  numerous  foreign concerns  have  entered  into compensa-
tion,  countertrade,  processing  or  related  agreements  with  the  Chi-
nese.35- Pursuant to these agreements  Chinese  workers  engage  in the
assembly of products for the export market.  Payment is made in goods
or from export  earnings.  Despite labor, quality control and infrastruc-
ture problems, many  of these projects have proved profitable for both
sides.356  For the Chinese, they offer Western capital, technology, man-
agerial  expertise  and  a  new  source  of jobs,  at  tolerable  foreign  ex-
change costs.  For the Western  venture partners, the main attraction is
relatively inexpensive labor and, in certain cases,  raw materials.
Without  a  greater willingness  by foreigners  to purchase  Chinese
products, however, the promise will not be realized.  The United States
and other nations eager to promote their trade with China have been
reluctant to accept imports of Chinese manufactured goods in volumes
comparable  to  their  exports  to  China. 3 57  In  the  United  States,  this
problem  is most graphically  illustrated by the resistance to imports  of
textile products.  In spite of the fact that the Chinese are now the larg-
est purchaser of cotton exported from the United  States, 358  the United
States government,  succumbing to domestic political pressure, insisted
upon  rigid  limitations  upon  Chinese  textiles  in  the  bilateral  textile
agreement negotiated in  1980.151  Yet if China cannot earn through ex-
ports the foreign exchange needed to pay for Western high technology
and  advanced  equipment,  the  prospects  for  substantial  trade  with
China  are not bright.
354  Crown,  China Markets First Tungsten Powders in  U.S., Amer. Metal  Mkt., Aug. 27,  1981;
Jabs, Chinese Offer to Sell U.S. Three Strategic Metals, Am. Metal Mkt.,  Sept.  15,  1980,  at 1.
355  P.  VERZARIU,  COUNTERTRADE  PRACTICES  IN  EAST  EUROPE,  THE  SOVIET  UNION  AND
CHINA  (1980).  Chinese countertrade transactions  are listed  at 98-102.
356  Kurata, Lower Costs Lure China Trades, FAR  E.  ECON.  REV.,  Feb. 27,  1981,  at 68.
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358  The Chinese purchased  more  than $700 million in U.S. cotton  in  1980.  George,  Gullo &
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Selecting the Right Venture Partner
Having considered the reasons for engaging in a joint venture with
the  Chinese,  the  prospective  foreign  investor  must  next  determine
which Chinese enterprise  to approach  about  a possible collaboration.
CITIC  stands ready  to assist in this matching process. 360  Experience
suggests,  however,  that  CITIC's  objectives  may  not  always  parallel
those  of  the  prospective  foreign  joint  venturer.  Indeed,  although
China-hands  are reluctant to publicly voice criticism  of CITIC, some
caution that CITIC has tried to direct foreign investment to locales in
China in need of development projects even if they lack the necessary
infrastructure or utilities, or are less than ideal from a strictly commer-
cial vantage point.
Instead of depending solely on CITIC, a potential foreign investor
would be well advised to conduct or commission the research necessary
to identify appropriate  Chinese venture parties.  Approaches  can then
be made to the entities in question and to the concerned provincial and
national  governmental  units.  Notwithstanding  the greater  autonomy
granted of late to local enterprises  and governing units, any joint ven-
ture with a value of more than 3 millionyuan  is likely to require from
an  early  stage  onward  at  least the  tacit approval  of higher  authori-
ties.361  As  a  consequence,  prospective  joint  venturers  will  enhance
their chances of attracting attention to their proposal and subsequently
securing approval for it by reaching out broadly  from the beginning.
Negotiating  Strategy-Overcoming
the Foreign  Exchange Barrier
The core of any effective strategy in negotiating with the Chinese
is to identify the wants and needs of the Chinese side and to develop
proposals which match their interests with those of the Western venture
partner.  This will require an understanding  of Chinese development
priorities and the other factors that, as discussed above, shape her atti-
tude to foreign investment.  Key elements in this analysis are arranging
suitable  sources  of foreign  exchange  and  developing  an  appropriate
structure for the relationship  between-the parties.
Projects  which promise to generate foreign exchange  in the near
term by means  of export sales present something  of a solution to this
problem.  There  are numerous  examples  of successful assembly  shop
360  Comments of Rong Yiren  at Washington Hilton Hotel, Oct. 9,  1979.
361  Terry, More Power to the Cities: An Interview with Vice  fayors of Be(ing and  Shanghai  on
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operations-basically, contracted Chinese labor-which involve hiring
Chinese workers to put together parts manufactured  outside of China,
such as in Hong Kong, for sale of products in the domestic, tourist  or
export markets.362  These ventures, which  do not entail  equity invest-
ment in China and thus are not carried out through a joint venture  as
that term is defined in the Joint Venture Law, have become fairly com-
mon, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, with overseas Chinese en-
trepreneurs.363  For example, Millie's Holdings Ltd. of Hong Kong has
in  recent  years  supplied  the  Chinese  with  equipment  and  materials
made in Hong Kong to facilitate the manufacture of textiles, shoes and
handbags  in  the  Shenzhen  special  export  zones  located  close  by  the
Hong Kong border.36  To take a variant, Reynolds Tobacco is supply-
ing the Amoy Cigarette  Factory with processed tobacco and the neces-
sary  machinery  to produce  Camel  filter cigarettes  for  sale  in  China
Friendship  Stores, which  serve tourists and the resident foreign  com-
munity.365  At a somewhat more complex  level, in late  1980 Westing-
house and Combustion Engineering  signed an agreement with the First
Ministry  of Machine  Building  under which  they  will, at  least  at  the
outset, supply the Chinese with the bulk of parts needed for 600-mega-
watt thermal turbine generators and boilers.366  These parts will then be
assembled  by  Chinese  labor, together  with  other  Chinese  produced
parts, for sale by the Chinese, largely in the PRC.367  Such projects ulti-
mately present limited possibilities,  however, in that the foreign party
lacks control over the work performed in China, does not participate in
any profits earned in China and enjoys only indirect access  to the do-
mestic Chinese market.  Further, not all enterprises can be carried out
in this fashion:  international  class hotels  and steel mills are ventures
which are too complicated to be contracted out and require substantial
hard currency  financing.
An  intermediate  approach  between  merely  assembling  torelgn-
made parts and a full-fledged joint venture  is that of counter or com-
pensation trade.368  Here the Western party makes an investment in the
form of technology  or equipment, and is paid, in whole or in part, in
the products  produced  by the Chinese.  Usually,  these are  the direct
362  See Kurata, supra note 356 at  68.
363  Id.; Kamm,  Exporting Some of Hong  Kong  ...  Exporting Some of China, Guangdong
SEZS,  CHINA Bus. REv.,  Mar.-Apr.  1980, at 28.
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products of the invested technology or equipment, which are then sold
on the world market for hard currency.  For example, Container Trans-
port, Inc. (CTI) of White Plains, New York entered into an agreement
with the Chinese National Machinery Import and Export Corporation
(MACHIMPEX) in February of 1979  to help the Chinese build a fac-
tory  in  Canton capable  of producing  more  than  10,000  twenty-foot
equivalent containers per year.369  In return for its assistance, CTI ob-
tained the exclusive right of first refusal to buy a minimum  of 50,000
containers  at  a fixed price over a five year period  from the  plant. 37°
Similarly, the Chinese are now producing landing-gear  doors in China
for McDonnell Douglas, thereby acquiring needed technology and, in
effect, giving McDonnell Douglas  a prototype of what a joint venture
with the  particular  Chinese  entity might be like  at a  low  cost  to  all
involved.371
A variation on this theme involves marketing  a different product
and possibly utilizing a marketing company on the foreign side of the
transaction.372  This was  the  approach of one Australian  firm which
proposed to exchange prefabricated  hotel rooms  with the Chinese for
frozen and canned foods (in addition to blocks of hotel reservations).373
The more players,  of course, the greater the complications.374
The counter trade concept has been put into practice in the context
of trade with several Eastern European  countries. 375  It has been used
in various  transactions  with  China  calling  for the  exchange  of such
items as fishing trawlers for shrimp and fish, electronic watch machin-
ery for watches, knitting and sewing machines for textile products and
the machinery  to manufacture  road  building  equipment  for  cement
spreaders.376
Countertrade,  however, has certain  built-in limitations.  Such ar-
rangements may cross bureaucratic lines, making it necessary to obtain
approvals  from  several  ministries  which may  have  conflicting  inter-
369  Jones, Four Marine Container  Agreements Cause Competition Socialist Style, CHINA  Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec.  1980, at 47; Kraar,  A  U.S. Company' Risk-Proof  China Deal,  FORTUNE,  Mar. 23,
1981, at 95.
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Asian Wall  St. J., July 4,  1979, at 4.
371  Id.
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ests. 377  By definition, there is no continuing investment in an enterprise
in China.  Countertrade  offers limited direct access,  at best, to the do-
mestic Chinese  market.  And, in at least some  instances,  the Chinese
bureaucracy is seeking to increase foreign exchange earnings by requir-
ing Chinese factories to pay in foreign currency for the goods obtained
from other Chinese factories that would be used as barter with foreign-
ers, on the theory that these items could  otherwise be sold directly to
foreign purchasers. 378  Finally, countertrade  is probably unsuitable for
large projects that involve substantial management  responsibilities, ex-
ternal financing  and long lead time before revenue is generated.
If one or more of these problems is present, the joint venture mode
may  offer  a  better  alternative.  If so, it  will be  up to the prospective
Western partner to devise a means to circumvent the foreign exchange
problems.  This may mean  selecting projects--such as tourism-which
are capable of generating foreign exchange, involving overseas  and lo-
cal Chinese investors who hold Rmb received  as compensation for na-
tionalizations,3 9 securing  low interest  foreign development  or export
bank  financing,  devising  methods  of reducing  foreign  exchange  ex-
penditures  of  the  Chinese  or  arranging  back-to-back  marketing
schemes selling Chinese raw materials or manufactures unrelated to the
project itself. Obviously, this will require imagination and financial in-
genuity.
380
Negotiating Style
Issues of style  or approach  take on great importance  in negotia-
tions with the Chinese.  Anxious to maintain bureaucratic caution, ea-
ger  to  sort  carefully  and  comparatively  through  the  raft  of foreign
proposals  put forward  lest China's limited foreign exchange  holdings
be wasted, and wary about unfamiliar Western business ways, China's
trade negotiators  generally have  proceeded  at a pace with an eye  for
detail many American businesspersons have found difficult, if not frus-
trating.38'  Yet patience and a sensitivity that should not imply a lack of
firmness  are  indispensible  to  avoid  succumbing  to  less  than  desired
terms  and to  engender  confidence  in the  Chinese, who  will take  the
manner of the negotiations as evidence of the Western party's sincerity.
Such a negotiating style will contribute importantly toward developing
377  Goldsmith,  The Uncertain Winds of Countertrade,  CHINA  Bus.  REV.,  Jul.-Aug.  1980,  at 30-
31.
378  Based  on discussions  of co-author Alford with Chinese officials,  Feb.  1981.
379  Roselle, Local Leaders  May Aid China Ventures, Asian Wall  St. J.,  Sept. 7,  1981,  at  12.
380  Birenbaum  & Alford, supra note 3,  at 26.
381  Theroux, supra note 272, at 210-213.Ventures in the China Trade
3:56(1981)
a backlog of goodwill to buttress the still weak formal legal protections
available and to facilitate  conclusion of a comprehensive  agreement.
That an ill-conceived  approach can spell failure is evidenced viv-
idly by the experience  of one of the first American  multinationals  to
conclude  a major deal with the Chinese in the charged atmosphere  of
the  commercial breakthrough  of the late  1970's.  Enthralled  by their
success in reaching a tentative understanding about a multimillion dol-
lar venture, the  American  company  ignored the  stated  desire  of the
Chinese to keep their agreement confidential while the Chinese clari-
fied details and secured further internal approvals, and instead called a
press conference to announce their triumph to the world, only to have
the Chinese react bitterly by cancelling the agreement.  This unfortu-
nate story is not unique.
Writing it All Down
Notwithstanding the spurt of activity on the legal front in recent
months, the PRC's codified economic laws and legal institutions are at
most still in a formative  stage and as such, provide an unfamiliar set-
ting for foreign businesspersons  accustomed  generally to operating in
more established and accesssible  legal contexts.  Ironically, the relative
absence in China of an on-going and transparent commercial legal sys-
tem-the  absence  of which may be attributable  in part to the tradi-
tional Chinese skepticism about formal law--dictates that even greater
attention  be paid to drafting  careful  and comprehensive  legal instru-
ments than would ordinarily be the case in transnational transactions.
In essence,  the new  and as yet untested  and incomplete  commercial
legal context mandates that any joint venture agreement with the Chi-
nese address all imaginable concerns and, in effect, create its own set of
rules.  The alternative is to leave unarticulated problems to be resolved
by unclear and uncertain  standards.
The post-contract conduct of the Chinese strongly supports a strat-
egy of getting it all in writing.  Foreign parties who have failed to press
for comprehensive  coverage  of their positions  in their contracts  have
learned that accordingly they may have less than full protection.  Other
foreigners have found the Chinese willing, through the vehicle of com-
mercial contracts, to grant tax and other concessions that are not publi-
cized in existing laws or elsewhere.3"2  Ultimately, to paraphrase one of
China's  Vice  Premiers,  China's joint venture  law  is largely what the
382 See Hsia & Haun, s'upra  note  102, at 79-83;  BusINEss WrrH CHINA  (N. Wang ed.  1980) at
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venture partners  agree, contractually, to make it.
383
CONCLUSION
At the end, we come back to our beginning.  The extreme swings
in Western  attitudes toward China are no basis on which to make  an
important commercial decision concerning  investment in that country.
In the final analysis, the real China changes less than does China's im-
age in the minds of her many Western suitors.  Only by coming to un-
derstand the enduring  continuities in Chinese thought and experience
can one begin to assess what is truly changing in China.  So despite the
alternating moods of extreme enthusiasm and deep despair, the attrac-
tion of doing business in and with  China remains; but only if the busi-
ness  serves China's needs  as well  as those of the prospective  investor,
and only if a prospective investor has the commitment,  determination
and understanding of China required to overcome the many and inevi-
table problems which lie ahead.  Updating Confucius,  only he who by
understanding the Old can gain knowledge of the New is fit to meet the
challenge of investing in China's future.3 8
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